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Abstract
The Responsibility to Protect (R2P) is a three-pillar document that was unanimously
approved and adopted at the 2005 World Summit Meeting by members of the United
Nations General Assembly (UNGA) to serve as a guideline for addressing mass atrocity
crimes. The research problem concerned the successful implementation of the third pillar,
a key fixture of R2P, which allows the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) to use
forceful measures, as a last resort to address mass atrocity crimes. However, a climate of
division within the UNSC has led to inaction. Using the R2P doctrine as a theoretical
framework, the purpose of this qualitative case study was to examine the third pillar, in
crisis related situations, such as Syria beginning in 2012. The research questions
addressed the application of the third pillar in crisis related situations involving mass
atrocity crimes, specifically in Syria. This study used a qualitative case study framework
to collect, examine, and analyze secondary data on R2P. This data was coded using a
descriptive coding strategy, where similar words, phrases, and ideological beliefs were
analyzed and developed into major themes for synthesis and analysis. The results found
an inconsistent application of the third pillar, resulting in policy inaction, and even failure
of public administration to achieve consensus within the UNSC. The implications for
positive social change include recommendations for procedures on successfully
implementing the third pillar, if the UNSC fails to act. The potential public policy
modification would allow victims of mass atrocities crimes the opportunity to achieve
safety and security, in accordance with the United Nations (UN) Charter’s common
purposes and principles.
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Chapter 1: Introduction to the Study
The Responsibility to Protect (R2P) is a three-pillared document that emerged
from the World Summit meeting in 2005 within the United Nations. The R2P is a
guideline for protecting civilians in failed or failing states. The R2P doctrine united the
member states in the United Nations by declaring that “all state governments have a
responsibility/obligation to protect their own populations from genocide, war crimes,
ethnic cleansing, and crimes against humanity” (Gholiagha, 2015, p. 1074). After the
tragedies in Rwanda and Kosovo, Kofi Annan—then acting Secretary-General—issued a
challenge to the member states of the United Nations stating that “humanitarian
interventions are unacceptable and considered a knock-on sovereignty” and questioning
how the UN should “respond to mass atrocities, particularly after the failings of the
UNSC [United Nations Security Council] in Rwanda and Kosovo?” (UN Department of
Public Information, 2012, p. 1). In 2001, in response to Annan, the Canadian government
created the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS),
which established the guidelines previously mentioned for protecting the citizens of
member states (ICISS, 2001). In 2004, Annan endorsed the “emerging norm of R2P”
through the panel on High-Level Threats, Challenges and Change (UN Department of
Public Information, 2012, p. 1). Annan acknowledged the existence of a collective
international responsibility and posited that the UNSC should be an authoritative body
only as a last resort, if mass atrocities have occurred and a state has failed in its
responsibility to protect its citizens, either willingly or unwillingly. The panel identified
some basic criteria to legitimately authorize the use of force by the UNSC: (a) the
seriousness of the threat, (b) last resort option, and (c) a proportional response (UN
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Department of Public Information, 2012). Additionally, all member states accepted the
principles of R2P and agreed that if a state has manifestly failed to meet their
responsibilities, then all states (i.e., the international community) have the responsibility
to protect these people threaten by mass atrocity crimes when all peaceful means have
been exhausted. In 2012, Syria eventually met the criteria of a failed state according to
the three pillars of R2P. Additionally, after exhausting all peaceful means (i.e.,
diplomatic and humanitarian), the international community, via the UNSC and in
accordance with the UN Charter (1945), should have acted collectively in a “timely and
decisive manner” at the beginning of this crisis (p. 2).
According to the UN Security Council (2011), the three pillars of R2P are as
follows:
1. The State carries the primary responsibility for protecting populations
from genocide, war crimes, crimes against humanity, and ethnic cleansing,
and their incitement.
2. The international community has a responsibility to encourage and assist
States in fulfilling this responsibility.
3. The international community has a responsibility to use appropriate
diplomatic, Humanitarian, and other means to protect populations from
these crimes. If a State is manifestly failing to protect its populations, the
international community must be prepared to take collective action to
protect populations, in accordance with the UN Charter. (pp. 3–4)
In this study, the researcher analyzed the implementation of Pillar 3—the use of force
when all peaceful means have failed—to answer the posed research questions. The
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implementation of Pillar 3 was the most contested principle of the R2P doctrine during
the Syrian crisis. The Russians and the Chinese used their veto power to block all
resolutions proposed by the West on Syria (Grover, 2015). Grover suggested that this
gamesmanship was a stall tactic on the use of force, where no peaceful means were an
option. Kolmašová (2016) further explained that a lack of consensus on what constituted
an adequate response, as well as limited prospects of a successful outcome, have
prevented an international response to the humanitarian crisis in Syria. The UNSC was
polarized along ideological lines, the permanent three (i.e., United States, United
Kingdom, and France) versus the permanent two (i.e., Russia and China), could not
achieve a vote of consensus, especially after the Libyan experience. After analyzing the
intervention in Libya, Kolmašová concluded that the Libyan case had two fundamental
differences from the Syrian case: (a) no national/strategic interests by China and Russia;
where the Russians and Chinese challenged the West on what they believed to be regime
change; and (b) no regional support for the Gaddafi regime. If Pillar 3 were to have
legitimacy and legality, one of the main criteria was to achieve consensus by the
permanent five members (P5) within the UNSC: The United States, United Kingdom,
France, China, and Russia. The UNSC needed to act in a collective manner to maintain
peace and security. All other member states rotate on the UNSC; however, they did not
have permanent statuses, and thus have no veto power. Coen (2015) noted that invoking
Pillar 3 of the R2P doctrine required that all permanent members, either through
abstinence or actively voting for implementation, agreed on the merits of the intervention.
Although consensus was achieved in the Libyan crisis of 2011, but consensus on the use
of Pillar 3 in Syria (2012) was not attainable. Lombardo (2015) suggested that the UNSC

4
was paralyzed in adopting a resolution because Russia and China issued a veto.
Nevertheless, R2P is the doctrine promoted within the international community as the
guideline for intervening to protect civilians at risk for mass atrocity crimes and crimes
against humanity.
At the World Summit in 2005, the UN universally recognized the need to respond
collectively to crises involving mass atrocities. The R2P doctrine emerged as a guideline
for the UN to respond collectively to crises that threatened the international peace and
security. There were four problem areas addressed by the outcome document: (a)
sustainable development (social, economic, and other related fields), (b) peace and
collective security, (c) human rights and the rule of law, and (d) strengthening of the UN
by enhancing its authority to respond to the challenges of time. Peace and collective
security, part of the common purposes of the UN Charter, are at the core of the R2P
doctrine. S. W. Lee (2012) explained:
R2P is not just one concept, but rather a cluster of ideas centered upon a sovereign
states’ responsibility to protect its people. (a) Each state has a responsibility to
protect its citizens (pillar one); (b) The international community has an obligation
to ensure states honor this responsibility (pillar two); and (c) If a state manifestly
fails in their duties, the international community may use all necessary means to
provide this protection (pillar three). (p. 252)
Furthermore, the stated shared interests of the UN Charter (1945) showed the need for
maintaining international peace and security. Chapter 1 of the UN Charter explains the
“common purposes and interests” of the UN, and the common theme is to maintain peace
and security (S. W. Lee, 2012). The R2P doctrine emerged as the vehicle through which
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the UN fulfilled its obligations under the UN Charter (1945) to maintain peace and
security within the international community. Given the historical dynamics of
international relations, the state is looked upon as having exclusive rights to sovereignty.
Due to the R2P dynamic of focusing on fundamental human rights as being sovereign,
rising complexities have hindered the implementation of Pillar 3 in most of the ongoing
global crises.
The current system of international relations has defined the world in terms of
nation-states consisting of borders, although it is the people that make up these nationstates, which the R2P doctrine is primarily concerned. The R2P doctrine challenged state
sovereignty as the central focus in international relations, shifting the focus to the
individual. T. H. Lee (2014) explained that the purpose of R2P is to undermine the
principle of exclusive sovereignty and the notion that no other state has the right or
responsibility to interfere in how it treats its people, especially by force. Individual rights,
particularly basic human rights, should not be minimized by the notion of state
sovereignty. Power—specifically within the international realm of “Real Politiks”—
obscures any challenges to state sovereignty, even if it means capitulation to mass human
atrocities. Grover (2015) explained:
At what point those human rights violations (threatened or actual) are egregious
enough to warrant UN Security Council involvement via the use of authorized
threats of or use of force to prevent and/or end such international atrocity crimes
is of course very much colored by political and strategic State interests. Hence, as
we all know, the international community has since World War II tolerated many
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mass atrocities of varying scales in diverse States on more than one continent. (p.
1115)
The literature showed evidence of the international community’s acceptance of the R2P
doctrine. The R2P emerged from the 2005 World Summit, where leaders of all member
states formally accepted the concept of protecting their populations from the four core
crimes against humanity (UN General Assembly, 2005). In addition, if a state manifestly
fails to provide protection and other means do not appear to render a peaceful solution,
then the international community should act collectively in a timely, decisive manner to
use all available means to protect the civilian population in question (UN General
Assembly, 2005).
The research demonstrated that a gap exists in the literature on the policies and
procedures to implement Pillar 3 when the UNSC failed to achieve consensus on using
force to protect civilian populations from failed nation-states. This allows the pain and
suffering of civilian populations, such as in Syria, to continue. Bellamy and Williams
(2006) cited a lack of appropriate and tested military doctrine on how to perform the
tasks of civilian protection. Libya is the only case on record where the international
community has agreed to use force collectively to protect—thereby intervening
militarily—in a state with a functioning legitimate government. T. H. Lee (2014)
explained that traditionally, nation-state leaders would only intervene on behalf of their
own citizens or the citizens of their allies, within another country's sovereign territory.
The emergence of R2P, along with the increase in states failing to meet the criteria of
providing safety and security to their citizens, the implementation of Pillar 3 emerged as
the only viable option to prevent/stop mass atrocities from continuing. Pillar 3,
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theoretically, should prevent further suffering and mass loss of life in most crisis-related
situations, such as Syria.
Through an exhaustive review of the literature, this researcher discovered a gap
which promoted the implementation of Pillar 3 to bring safety and security to civilians
when a crisis has reached an impossible conclusion, such as in Syria. This researcher
examined Pillar 3—the collective use of force—of the R2P doctrine by using the Syrian
crisis as a case study, while briefly comparing the Libyan case, in the context of the
research. Additionally, the researcher expanded on the literature seeking to protect
civilians, based on the common purposes and principles of the UN Charter. Also, the
researcher expanded on the literature of the R2P doctrine, which promotes the protection
of fundamental human rights.
In the following sections, the researcher discusses the background of the Syrian
crisis and the inability of the UNSC to reach a consensus implementing R2P, as well as
previous research on the doctrine. Additionally, the researcher presents the study’s
research questions, as well as the procedures for data collection and data analysis.
Finally, the researcher provides a discussion on the study’s implications for positive
social change to conclude the chapter.
Background
The R2P evolved from the concept of human security and humanitarian
intervention. In 2005, Secretary-General Kofi Annan approved of this emerging norm,
explaining a collective international responsibility remained to intervene—if necessary,
militarily—to protect civilians when a state has failed in its duties to do the same (UN
General Assembly, 2005). After the 2005 World Summit, R2P emerged as the guideline
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for addressing crimes against humanity and mass atrocities, stressing the need to maintain
peace and security. Nuruzzaman (2013) stated that the theoretical significance of the R2P
doctrine lies in initiating a change in basic assumptions from the right of intervention to
an obligation to intervene.
The literature exposed a conflict among many researchers’ interpretations of Pillar
3 of the R2P doctrine. For example, Berti (2014) questioned whether the true principles
of R2P were rooted in the decisions to intervene and explored how the decision to use
force in Libya affected Syria. Lappin (2014) analyzed the legal basis for military
intervention in Syria and the precedents of using force by the international community.
Cubukcu (2013) examined the R2P doctrine from these three perspectives: (a) legal,
ethical, and political implications; (b) historical and moral implications; and (c) distrust
and polarization within the UNSC. T. H. Lee (2014) compared the unilateral actions of
the United States and Russia, in Syria and Crimea respectively, as illegal under
international law. Conversely, R2P was used to measure legal intervention by the UNSC.
Marrone (2015) examined the relationship among state responsibility, the international
community, organizations, and civilians being impacted by devastation. Sloan (2014)
examined the evolution of the role of the UNSC as peacekeepers, as opposed to military
interventionists, even though the UNSC possessed the ability to use a strong offensive
force. Thakur (2013) explained the third pillar of the R2P, describing it as
“understandably contentious” (p. 61). Both Sloan and Thakur examined the conditions in
both Libya and Syria to distinguish how different conclusions occurred, despite similar
conditions.
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Grover (2015) explained how semantics have allowed for the continuation of the
mass loss of life and other atrocities to plague Syrian civilians, and how those who have
veto power used language to continue to deny the use of force when there was no
peaceful solution found. Furthermore, Grover (2015) stated that using veto power was an
“act of aggression itself” (p. 1112). These examples conveyed the complexities of
implementing Pillar 3, including legal concerns, moral indignation, P5 polarization, and
the lack of regional support—particularly in the Middle East. These complexities have
historically impeded the implementation of the R2P doctrine, thereby allowing for the
continuation of mass death and suffering in countries such as Syria.
These varying views have allowed for political friction within the international
community, especially the UNSC. Bellamy and Williams (2006) analyzed the challenges
of working through the subsystems and coalitions of the security council, and how these
challenges have created political discord within the international community on using
military force. Consequently, these challenges have stagnated the implementation of
Pillar 3 by allowing unrest and instability to flourish in the Middle East, particularly in
Syria. Grover (2015) indicated that life-or-death consequences existed for Syrian
civilians because of members of the UNSC used veto power to stall the action by force
where no peaceful options could end the mass atrocities.
The R2P doctrine, as promoted by most member states in the UN, sought to
advance the common ideological purposes and principles of peace and security for all.
This doctrine indicates the need for collective intervention to stop the mass atrocities in
Syria. For these reasons, the researcher conducted this study and identified the potential
inconsistences of policy formulation and implementation.
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Problem Statement
Pillar 3 of the R2P doctrine suggested that when all diplomatic and peaceful
means are exhausted to resolve a crisis, such as in the case of Syria, then using force as a
tool for intervention by the UNSC should be a viable option. The use of force as an
intervention tool, however, has been a point of contestation between members of the
UNSC concerning matters related to Syria. Several studies revealed that implementing
Pillar 3, particularly in the case of Syria, was controversial and complex. For example,
Bailey (2014) posited that implementing Pillar 3 in Syria is contentious because there are
no belligerent acts on both sides. Kildron (2012) stated that Syria was not a good
candidate for Pillar 3 because the four criteria needed for success (i.e., an international
mandate, a coalition of the willing, regional support, and a credible opposition force)
were not present. Coen (2015) explained that the only way to protect the civilians in Syria
was to classify them as refugees, thereby making them eligible for protection under R2P.
Other researchers provided a different perspective on implementing Pillar 3 in the
Syrian situation. Grover (2015) argued that the implementation of R2P by threat or force
is justified when it comes to the purposes of the UN Charter (1945). Vanhullebusch
(2015) articulated that military intervention through Pillar 3 should be implemented
through regional organizations, as backed by the UNSC. Kolmašová (2016) suggested
that the failure to act in Syria was not a failure of R2P, but of the imperfect actors and
institutions charged with its implementation.
The conflict in Syria placed the peace and security of the Syrian people—as well
as the nation’s immediately in the proximity of this crisis—in grave danger. Mass
migration created border concerns in Jordan and Turkey, internal displacement
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engendered inhumane living conditions, and the use of chemical weapons exacerbated the
suffering of the Syrian people. Coen (2015) suggested that the world was witnessing the
greatest refugee crisis since World War II, where conflict, violence, and human rights
violations have displaced millions of people, primarily due to the ongoing civil war in
Syria. In addition, the number of fatalities was at least 560,000, with 6.7 million refugees
and 6.2 million people who were internally displaced. According to the Global Centre for
the Responsibility to Protect (GCR2P), Syria had the largest number of people forcibly
displaced by any conflict in the world; as of 2020, an estimated 12 million Syrians
continue to remain in dire need of humanitarian assistance (Global Centre for the
Responsibility to Protect, 2019).
Although R2P was guided by the three pillars to prevent/stop mass atrocities in
states with leaders who fail to meet their responsibilities to protect their citizens, the
achievement of consensus to implement Pillar 3 within the UNSC has allowed the crisis
to manifest (Bellamy & Williams, 2006, p. 497). Norooz (2015) cited several areas in the
world where civilian populations were at risk of mass atrocities and living in failed states.
According to the three pillars of R2P, Syria is a failed state; therefore, the problem is a
lack of study on policy by the UN to implement Pillar 3 when the UNSC fails to achieve
consensus, and when all peaceful/diplomatic means have been exhausted, allowing the
crisis to persist. In addition, the literature conveyed that a gap exists on implementing
Pillar 3 of the R2P doctrine. Overall, the problem that the current researcher aimed to
examine was the inability of the UNSC to implement Pillar 3 of the R2P doctrine fully
and consistently, which authorizes the use of force to protect civilians from further
suffering and mass atrocities. The researcher addressed this gap by analyzing the voting
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records of the five permanent members (P5) of the UNSC, websites, videos, prior
interviews conducted by nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), and other documents
that have impacted the implementation of Pillar 3 in Syria to determine whether there
were viable policy alternatives to achieving consensus in the UNSC on implementing
Pillar 3 on a case-by-case basis.
Purpose of the Study
The purpose of this qualitative case study was to impact positive social change by
examining the implementation of Pillar 3 in a crisis-related situation, such as Syria. This
purpose was vital, given that Syria has experienced mass atrocities between 2012 to the
present, and continues to experience the disruption of peace and security within the
international arena. The crisis in Syria has been described as a good example for using
military force to protect Syrian civilians from further mass atrocities in accordance with
the UN Charter (1945). The preamble of the UN Charter establishes the common interests
and purposes of the UN. The preamble mentions three areas of common interests: (a) “to
save succeeding generations from the scourge of war, (b) to reaffirm faith in fundamental
human rights, and (c) to establish the conditions under which justice and the respect for
obligations from treaties and other sources of international law be maintained” (p. 2). In
addition, the preamble states that armed force should not be used unless to in the
preservation of common interests. Grover (2015) suggested that the preamble of the UN
Charter indicates that fundamental human rights and the right of self-determination of all
peoples were central to and a significant part of the pre-existing axiomatic “common
interests” stated in that preamble (p. 1114). Grover further suggested that stopping or
preventing the continuation of the mass atrocities occurring in Syria is in the common
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interests of the UN. Grover alleged that the protection of the fundamental human rights
and human dignity of all peoples are foundational to international peace and security,
which is not inconsistent with the purposes of the UN Charter (1945). These protections
are articulated as core purposes, or common interests.
The purposes and principles of the UN Charter (1945) are declared in its Chapter
1, Article 1. Each successive section in Chapter 1 explains how this achieved, with
emphasis on cultivating international peace and security through peaceful means. If all
peaceful means have been exhausted and UNSC consensus seems an impossible
conclusion, the use of force should be a viable option, according to the common
purposes/interest of the UN Charter to maintain international peace and security. The last
paragraph of Article 1, Section 7 authorizes the enforcement measures stated in Chapter 7
of the UN Charter (1945). Chapter 7 of the UN Charter outlines the actions that may be
taken, specifically by the UNSC, to address threats, breaches of the peace, and acts of
aggression. Article 42 of Chapter 7 states that if all peaceful and diplomatic means prove
inadequate, then forceful measures may be undertaken by air, sea, or land forces as
necessary to maintain or restore international peace and security (UN Charter, 1945, p.
9). Consequently, the R2P doctrine, specifically Pillar 3, was addressed in the problem
statement of this study; the researcher proposes the expansion of policy to guide the
UNSC decision-making process on using force to stop mass atrocities in the future.
Research Questions
The research questions spurred the collection of credible information on the
complexities of implementing Pillar 3 of the R2P doctrine to stop/prevent mass atrocities
in the case of a failed nation-state—in this case, Syria. The identification of some of these
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complexities within the UNSC, where vetoes were used by a member of the P5 to disrupt
consensus. Consequently, the researcher identified and explored the alternative
policy(ies) on implementing Pillar 3 when there is non-consensus in the UNSC. The
research questions were as follows:
RQ1: Was R2P applied consistently across all modern crisis-related human
endeavors?
RQ2: Did the application of R2P result in negative outcomes?
RQ3: Would a historically consistent application of R2P help alleviate the crisis
in Syria?
Theoretical Framework
The theoretical framework for this study was the doctrine of the R2P itself. In
December 2001, the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty was
formed by the Canadian government in response to then Secretary-General Kofi Annan.
After the humanitarian crises in in the late 1990s, Annan presented the UN members with
the question of when, how and why responding to humanitarian crises would be in
accordance with the principles and purposes of the UN (UN Charter, 1945, p. 1). The
ICISS (2001) found the following:
That sovereignty not only gave a State the right to “control” its affairs, but it also
conferred on the State primary “responsibility” for protecting the people within its
borders. It proposed that when a State fails to protect its people – either through
lack of ability or a lack of willingness – the responsibility shifts to the broader
international community. (p. 1)
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This framework (i.e., R2P) established the guidelines for the use of military force as an
intervention tool to protect citizens at risk of mass atrocities. In addition, the researcher
used the R2P framework to investigate the complexities of implementing Pillar 3 (i.e., the
use of military force) by UNSC in a case, such as Syria. In Chapter 2, the researcher
discusses this framework in the review of the literature by analyzing the history and
traditions of nation-states, sovereignty, and protecting vulnerable populations.
Nature of the Study
The researcher selected a qualitative methodology approach to guide this study.
Qualitative research seeks to explore phenomena through individuals’ personal
experiences. Patton (2015) explained that the first contribution of qualitative inquiry is
illuminating meanings and exploring how humans engage in meaning-making. A
qualitative design allowed for the use of a case study approach to examine the actions of
the UNSC in Syria. This led to an inability to reach a consensus on resolutions that called
for the use of force, by the international community, to protect the Syrian civilian
population from continued mass atrocities. Yin (2009) defined case study research as the
study of a case within a real-life, contemporary context or setting.
Definitions
The researcher used the following terms and definitions frequently in developing
and conducting this study. These terms enhanced the understanding of the challenges
facing the international community in the historical context of sovereignty, with the
emerging doctrine of R2P. Historically, sovereignty focused on the nation-state, while the
R2P doctrine emphasizes individual sovereignty through the protection of civilians when
mass atrocities occur.

16
Collective security: Collective security is a system of maintaining world peace
and security by concerted action on the part of the nations of the world (Thakur, 2016).
Exclusive sovereignty: T. H. Lee (2014) explained exclusive sovereignty as the
idea that a sovereign state has autonomy within its own territory, and that no other state
has the right or responsibility to interfere in how it treats its people, especially by force of
arms.
Internally displaced person (IDP): IDP describes an individual who has not
crossed an international frontier, but has fled their home, for whatever reason (Internal
Displacement Monitoring Centre, 2014).
Jus cogens: Lappin (2014) defined the actions of using chemical weapons on the
Syrian population, as jus cogen norms that amount to a crime against humanity, from
which no state may derogate in its actions.
Just war theory (JWT): Parsons (2013) stated that war under certain conditions
can be morally justified. There are three principles parts of JWT: (a) jus ad bellum, the
justice of resorting to war; (b) jus in bello, just conduct in war; and (c) jus post bellum,
justice at the end of war. Norooz (2015) explained that JWT needs two conditions to be
satisfied, to justify intervention: (a) the right reasons and (b) mass loss of civilian life.
Nation-state: The term nation-state conjoins the political entity of a state to the
cultural entity of a nation from which it derives its political legitimacy to rule and its
status as a sovereign state (Guibernau, 2013).
Popular sovereignty: Grover (2015) referred to sovereignty being derived from
the people, not something automatically given to those in charge. Popular sovereignty is
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in direct contestation with the notion of state sovereignty because power lies with the
people, instead of the regime.
Refugees: This term describes people who have crossed an international frontier
and are at risk or have been victims of persecution in their country of origin (Internal
Displacement Monitoring Centre, 2014).
Responsibility to Protect (R2P) Doctrine: R2P is the enabling principle that first
obligates individual nation-states and then the international community to protect
populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing, and crimes against humanity.
The idea is that sovereignty is not a privilege, but a responsibility (UN Regional
Information Center for Western Europe, 2017). Ainley (2015) defined R2P as follows:
“Human life, human dignity, human rights raised above even the entrenched concept of
State sovereignty” (pp. 37–38).
Sovereignty: Sovereignty refers to the right of each state to manage domestic
affairs free from external interference (Bailey, 2014). Article 2(4) of the UN Charter
(1945) described sovereignty as “territorial integrity and political independence” (as cited
in Bailey, 2014, p. 109).
State responsibility: State responsibility is defined as the obligations a state has to
the international community to maintain peace and security (Borelli, 2017). Internal focus
is the responsibility on the part of the state to protect its own people, while external focus
is the responsibility of the international community to act when the host state is unwilling
or unable to do so (Bailey, 2014).
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Westphalian system: This global system is based on the principle of international
law that each state has sovereignty over its territory and domestic affairs, to the exclusion
of all external powers, and that each state is equal in international law (Teschke, 2002).
Assumptions
Assumptions are statements that the researcher presumes to be true, but which are
unverifiable (Merriam, 2014). The key variable was assumed for implementing Pillar 3 of
the R2P doctrine as achieving consensus within the UNSC, resulting in the collective
action to forcefully intervene on behalf of the civilian population in Syria, thereby
creating a sense of legality and legitimacy within the international community about the
intervention.
The researcher used what Creswell (2013) called “thick or complex description”
(p. 1094). Thick description is where the researcher gives detailed accounts of the
participants or setting. In this case, the researcher used prolonged engagement and
persistent observation of the data, triangulation of the data sources, peer review or
debriefing, and clarifying researcher bias (see Creswell, 2013). To ensure trustworthiness
or reliability, the researcher used interceding agreement on the research study. In
addition, the researcher used multiple sources of data for triangulation.
To ensure quality, the researcher used four criteria: substantive contribution (i.e.,
the study contributes to overall understanding), aesthetic merit (i.e., the researcher
succeeded aesthetically by inviting interpretive responses, and finding whether these
were creative, complex, and not boring), reflexivity (i.e., the researcher held himself
accountable for biases), and impact (i.e., the emotional and intellectual effect on the
researcher; Etherington, 2004; Tracy, 2019). The researcher tried to understand how to
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implement Pillar 3 when there was no consensus in the UNSC and mass atrocities
continue to cause severe suffering on a civilian population (i.e., Syria). The researcher
addressed his self-awareness and self-exposure and held himself accountable by stating
his biases upfront. The researcher reflected upon those biases more thoroughly and
reported the results.
Scope and Delimitations
The scope of this study included the civilian population of Syria, where the
population is caught in the middle of a civil war, proxy war, and the war on terror from
the beginning of the Syrian crisis in 2012 to the present. Global governance and
humanitarian intervention were closely related concepts that were not investigated in this
research. Although each concept advocates for some form of protection for civilians at
risk for crimes against humanity, each fall short in stating there is a distinct responsibility
of states to provide protection for their citizens.
In this study, the researcher focused on the lack of UNSC cooperation and
cohesion on the implementation of Pillar 3. The UNSC is divided along P3 (United
States, United Kingdom, and France) and P2 (Russia and China) lines, where the
differences in ideology (political, economic, environmental, and strategic) have
contributed to discord. The researcher used triangulation to provide a rich data set on the
lack of cooperation and cohesion in the UNSC by examining and collecting data from
multiple sources. These sources included email interviews, observations from websites,
and analysis of public documents (e.g., voting records and speeches). The researcher used
NVivo software for coding, keywords, and journal notes on R2P to establish themes and
patterns for transferability.
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Limitations
This study was limited by the complexity of achieving consensus within the
UNSC for implementing Pillar 3 in situations where mass atrocities are being committed,
particularly in Syria, 2012 to present. Coen (2015) suggested that based on the political
dynamics within the UNSC, using coercive force in Syria was not a viable option. Coen
further suggested that invoking Pillar 3 requires that all members of the P5 to agree by
actively voting or abstaining on the merits of intervention. Conversely, Grover (2015)
articulated that those P5 members using their veto power to obstruct the implementation
of Pillar 3 are using stall tactics based on semantics and these tactics can result in life-ordeath consequences. These complexities revolved around the national interests and
ideological beliefs of P5 members and how they were inclined to change on a case-bycase basis, thereby limiting the researcher’s ability to generalize the findings.
While the researcher engaged in an exhaustive and prolonged research process,
the large volume of data, as well as the crisis in Syria, continues to be debated within the
UNSC to this data; therefore, it is likely that valuable data was omitted. Furthermore, the
unique international experiences, alliances, and national interests of each participant,
factored into their perspective on the R2P phenomenon, which resulted in decreasing
their ability to achieve a consensus on the implementing Pillar 3 in Syria. National
strategic interests had the single greatest impact on implementing Pillar 3 in crisis related
situations. There was only a single case (Libya) where the UNSC achieved consensus to
implement Pillar 3 measures, limiting its potential dependability and transferability.
There may have been potential biases from the researcher. The researcher’s
education, experience, and culture are rooted in Western ideology, which may differ
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significantly from the data collected from the participants. The researcher’s personal
experiences with different cultures and education in politics and international relations
have provided him with a well-rounded outlook into the limitations of his knowledge that
may have biased this study. The strategies that the researcher used to address these biases
were triangulation, reflexivity, and persistent prolonged engagement of the research data.
In Chapter 3, a researcher presents a more detailed discussion of these techniques.
Significance of the Study
The significance of the study filled a gap in the literature by understanding and
promoting policy and procedure that allows for the proper implementation of Pillar 3
when consistent with the purposes and principle of the UN Charter (1945), specifically in
terms of the maintenance of the international peace and security. If all other diplomatic
and peaceful gestures were exhausted, then the UN still has an obligation to render
solutions to mass atrocity crimes being committed. Leaders require alternative policies
allowing for the UN general assembly to organize regional organizations, regional states,
or coalitions of the willing to implement Pillar 3 with a majority of support from
UN/UNSC member states, despite a veto from a P5 member. The policy impact may
involve being able to bypass the UNSC when it fails to achieve consensus on
implementing Pillar 3 to stop or prevent mass atrocity crimes form occurring or
continuing, as it has in Syria.
The UN Charter (1945) explained how faith in fundamental human rights, dignity,
and equal rights of all people are in the common interests of the international community,
and that “save in the common-interests” force should not be used. Mass atrocities that
violate the common-interests clause and disrupt international peace and security should
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not have a one-size-fits-all resolution. Thus, these may require forceful intervention. The
crisis in Syria revealed how UNSC inaction has contributed to the continuation of
suffering by civilians in Syria. By expanding policy on implementing Pillar 3 to include
regional countries, regional states, coalitions of the willing, and powerful states that act in
the interests of the UN Charter, future crisis of mass atrocities may be preventable or
deterred. Grover (2015) stated that although the UNSC was designated as the body
authorized to implement Pillar 3 and to maintain international peace and security, it is the
“UN Charter that is the ultimate guide for each member state in fulfilling the purposes
and principles of the UN” (pp. 1118–1120).
The knowledge from this study contributed to existing policy and expanded the
decision-making process of implementing Pillar 3 giving authority to the UN general
assembly, on a case-by-case basis, when the UNSC does not meet its R2P obligations
because of P5 veto power. The UN Charter (1945) preamble made it clear that resorting
to war was a potentially necessary and legitimate option in certain circumstances
(Grover, 2015).
Significance to Practice
In this study, the researcher advanced a policy toward the acceptance by the
international community, the UN, and the security council, all of whom needed to be
collaborators in the responsibility to protect vulnerable populations in the future, thus
living up to their obligations under the UN Charter (1945) of promoting human dignity.
With the emergence of the acceptance of fundamental human rights on the rise, and the
credible threat of collective action by the international community to confront those states
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who “manifestly fail to protect their populations,” maintaining international peace and
security was paramount (UN Charter, 1945). This can prevent mass migration, mass
displacement, and mass atrocities, thus lessening the burden on neighboring states and
providing for the human dignity of those at-risk populations (UN Charter, 1945).
Significance to Theory
The researcher aimed to advance the acceptance of Pillar 3 by the international
community, the UN, and the security council, all of which need to be collaborators in the
responsibility to protect vulnerable populations in the future. The impact allowed those
at-risk civilians to seek safe havens that will be established by the intervening forces,
thereby giving them access to the necessities needed to be secure. In addition, Kildron
(2012) suggested advancing policy based on what he called the Libyan model, outlining
that four criteria should be met before intervention is appropriate. These criteria include
the following: (a) there must be an international mandate calling for intervention, (b)
there must be a broad coalition to protect civilians, (c) there must be presence of regional
support, and (d) a credible opposition force must already be on the ground (Kildron,
2012). These four criteria were used as a guideline to expand on existing policy that may
be used by the UNSC or the UN general assembly when considering implementing Pillar
3 in the future.
Significance to Social Change
The implications for positive social change of this study meant safety and security
to many civilians who face mass atrocities and crimes against humanity, as defined by the
UN Charter (1945). Additionally, the findings may increase the support and acceptance
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for the use of force to prevent/limit mass human atrocities, which would serve the greater
good of the international community by promoting peace, stability, and security. In this
study, the researcher examined the literature for the UN to explore instituting policy that
will allow other member states to act, when the UNSC was unable to reach a consensus.
The positive social impact would allow displaced civilians the opportunity to seek safe
havens, where they would receive medical supplies, food, water, and shelter.
Furthermore, establishing safe havens would be beneficial to neighbor states, where mass
migration has had a negative impact on these states’ economic, political, and
environmental well-being, thus influencing safety and security of these displaced
individuals by creating a burden on the host countries.
Summary
In this chapter, the researcher provided the introduction, background, problem
statement, and purpose of the study. This researcher conducted a qualitative case study on
the UNSC and the implementation of R2P, using the Syria crisis as a case study and
example. Additionally, the researcher provided an overview on the contents of the
research question, assumptions, and limitations of the study. Finally, the researcher
concluded the chapter with the significance of the study and the implications for positive
social change, through expanding the R2P doctrine in future crises, that threaten
international peace and security. Chapter 2 includes a detailed analysis of the literature on
the R2P doctrine, presenting alternative views on using force, particularly in Syria. In
Chapter 3, the researcher provides a detailed explanation of the research plan for this
study. Chapter 4 includes the results and the analysis of data. In Chapter 5, the researcher
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discusses the interpretations of the findings, limitations of the study, implications for
positive social change, recommendations for future research, and conclusions.

Chapter 2: Literature Review
Introduction
The problem that the current researcher aimed to address was the inability of the
UNSC to implement Pillar 3 of the R2P doctrine, which authorizes the use of force, in
this case, to protect Syrian civilians from further suffering and mass atrocities since 2012.
The lack of cooperation and cohesion in the UNSC has allowed the crisis in Syria to
continue, despite exhausting what appears to be all efforts under Pillar 1 and 2. Grover
(2015) surmised that members in the UNSC use their veto power to prevent action by the
UNSC, which is an act of aggression toward the Syrian people, particularly when all
peaceful means have been exhausted.
Traditionally, the intervention into the internal affairs of a state by another state
was not an accepted practice, within the international order. Usually, these types of
actions were only taken when a state had a personal stake in the matter; therefore,
forceful intervention was done only on behalf of those citizens of the intervening state
who were at risk, or it was done on behalf of the allies of the intervening state, or to
protect the property of the intervening state. Bellamy and Williams (2006) found that
historically, these obstacles coalesced to produce a default policy environment that was
strongly averse to forceful intervention. Mistrust was also a key element in the traditional
international order for non-interventionist and the principles of exclusive sovereignty of
the state. T. H. Lee (2014) articulated that mistrust existed between states as to real
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intentions. National self-interests, coercion to implement political agendas, economic
agendas, and strategic alliances are some conditions that created this mistrust. Syria was a
prime example of the phenomenon. All the conditions were present, according to the R2P
doctrine, to proclaim Syria a failed state. The national interests of Russia, China, and the
North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), however, as well as a lack of political will
and public support, have led to a lack of real solutions being implemented in Syria. In the
interim, Syrian civilians continue to suffer mass atrocities, while the international
community remains reluctant to use force to stop/prevent further loss of life and
continued suffering. Thakur (2013) found that although successful, the Libyan operation
proved to be controversial among emerging powers, and the Syrians have paid the price
for this controversy. Consequently, the UNSC allowed the Syrian crisis to continue
because of the failures and consequences of the use of force in Libya, and a lack of
strategic policy on forceful intervention moving forward. In this chapter, the researcher
provides an overview of the literature search, analyzes R2P theory regarding the Syrian
crisis, and examines the complexities of implementing Pillar 3 in Syria in the current
framework of the UNSC.
Literature Search Strategy
The researcher gathered the articles used in this study from multiple sources.
Most of these sources stemmed from the database of the Walden University Library,
along with Google Scholar. There was no specific date range used in the search process,
but specific attention was paid to articles within the 5-year range of acceptance; however,
articles that addressed the historical significance and development of constructs related to
this study were used. Databases listed by names were used in the Walden University
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searches. These searches focused on R2P, humanitarianism, and human security. The
databases included Homeland Security Digital Library, Political Science Complete,
Military & Government Collection, International Security and Counter Terrorism
Reference Center, Expanded Academic ASAP, ProQuest Central, Sage Journals, Thoreau
Multi-Database Search, and United Nations Public Administration Network. In Google
Scholar searches, the researcher focused on all sources related to the R2P principle,
including books, articles, websites, videos, and organizations. When searching Google
Scholar articles, the researcher limited the scope to peer-reviewed articles to ensure
additional credibility. The following keywords/phrases were used, either individually or
in combinations, to find articles relevant to R2P and Syria: human security; economic
development; protecting civilians; Libya; Syria, mass atrocities, four core crimes against
humanity; UN Charter and the use of force; preventive security; international relations;
national security; world poverty; just war; humanitarianism and the use of force;
intervention and the use of force; global chaos, world hunger; Arab Spring; UNSC and
the responsibility to protect; UN resolutions on Syria; State sovereignty vs individual
rights; human dignity; and maintaining international peace and security. The scope of the
literature as previously mentioned, focused on articles of the past 5 years, except for
information which provided a historical context. The areas with limited current research
available are identified in statements throughout the study.
Theoretical Foundation
The theoretical foundation of this study was the doctrine of R2P. The R2P
doctrine includes three principles that guide the international community on protecting
civilian populations who are vulnerable to or currently suffering mass atrocities. There
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are few established theories on protecting individuals where their human rights are
considered to have been violated. Marrone (2015) examined the impact of R2P regarding
human security and human rights, where the global community has a responsibility to
protect civilians during conflict and post-conflict. The doctrine of R2P has evolved from
other theories that have emphasized protecting vulnerable populations and their
fundamental human rights: human security, humanitarian intervention, and global
governance. Hobbes (2010), Locke (1947), and Bodin (1992) explained their thoughts on
social contract theory, and the League of Nations (1920–1946) attempted to avert conflict
and maintain peace and security (as cited in Shapiro, 2010). The intent behind the R2P
doctrine—holding nation-states accountable to the international community for the
maintenance of peace and security—was not the first attempt by the international
community to hold nation-states accountable. The R2P doctrine was the theory that
emerged within the most recognized international authority—the UN—to address those
breaches of the peace contrary to the common purposes and principles of the UN General
Assembly (2005).
The treaty of Westphalia of 1648 established nation-states in a world where every
nation was governed either by an absolute monarch, tribal chief, or a theocratic hierarchy
(as cited in Toavs, n.d.). Westphalian sovereignty was based on the concept of a
sovereign state, governed by a sovereign ruler, that was based on establishing prejudice
in international affairs against interference in another nation's domestic business (Toavs,
n.d.). Nevertheless, the world has evolved to include governments that are more
representative of the people, including political bodies (i.e., U.S. Congress, parliament,
etc.), regardless, if they are a democracy, monarchy, republic, dictatorship, or some other
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type of political entity. Consequently, the nation-state became the primary medium by
which people identified themselves within the international community. The treaty of
Westphalia stood as the precursor to future international treaties, and to the development
of international law in general (Toavs, n.d.).
Philosophers Thomas Hobbes and John Locke were some of the earliest seminal
thinkers to believe that nation-states, or the sovereigns thereof, had some type of
responsibility to protect its citizens (Shapiro, 2010). Hobbes (2010) believed in the rights
of individuals and in the equality of all men, and he subscribed to the notion that the
contract that exists between men and the prevailing authority, only holds true, as long as,
the authority can provide protection (Shapiro, 2010). Differing from Hobbes (2010),
Locke (1947) believed that rulers only derive their authority through the consent of the
people, as power is delegated and can be removed for violating the terms of that trust
(Shapiro, 2010). Nevertheless, these early philosophers believed that protection of
individual rights were a part of the social contract between the prevailing sovereign
authority and their people.
The League of Nations (1919–1946) is one of the more well-known attempts by
the international community at cooperation or collective security to maintain peace and
security throughout the world. The three main objectives of the League, as stated by the
UN Office at Geneva (n.d.), were (a) to ensure collective security, (b) to assure functional
cooperation, and (c) to execute the mandates of peace treaties (p. 3). In the History of the
League of Nations, the United Nations Office at Geneva (n.d.) explained the following:
Born with the will of the victors of the First World War to avoid a repeat of a
devastating war, the League of Nations objective was to maintain universal peace
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within the framework of the fundamental principles of the Pact accepted by its
Members: to develop cooperation among nations and to guarantee them peace and
security. (p. 1)
Despite some early successes, however, the League of Nations could not prevent events
that led to World War II and the eventual demise of the League.
Despite these early successes, the League of Nations could not prevent the
invasion of Manchuria by Japan, nor the annexation of Ethiopia by Italy in 1936, nor that
of Austria by Hitler in 1938. The powerlessness of the League of Nations to prevent
further world conflict, the alienation of part of its member states, and the generation of
the war itself added to its demise from 1940 (UN Office at Geneva, n.d.). Although the
League of Nations sought to prevent conflict through cooperation and collective security,
the crises that led up to World War II helped to return some nation-states (i.e., Germany,
Italy, and Japan) back to the traditional system of defensive alliances and power blocs
(UN Office at Geneva, n.d.). By the end of World War II, the Allies were determined to
create a new organization, the UN, which had many similarities to the League of Nations.
In sum, after World War I, the international community established the League of
Nations for nation-states to have a forum to communicate their grievances to avoid
conflicts that might lead to another war.
On June 26, 1945, the UN was created by the Allies after their victory in World
War II. The preamble of the UN states the common purposes and principles of the
organization, which bore many similarities to that of the League of Nations. The first
sentence of the UN Charter (1945) cites the goal “to save succeeding generations from
the scourge of war, which twice in our lifetime has brought untold sorrow to mankind”
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(p. 2). The League of Nations discussed the “avoidance of a repeat of a devastating war”
(UN Office at Geneva, n.d., p. 1). Each document discusses the maintenance of peace and
security through cooperation and collective security. The UN Charter (1945) charged the
UNSC with providing that collective security. Chapter 7 of the Charter specifically
discusses the actions available to the UNSC when there are breaches of the peace. At the
conclusion of the Cold War, discussed earlier, those breaches of the peace began to be
recognized more in the form of individual fundamental human rights. The mass atrocities
committed in Bosnia and Rwanda ignited the beginnings of a change in thinking where
individual sovereignty, at times, would challenge the notion of state sovereignty. These
events resulted in fierce debate about the responsibility of the international community,
according to the common purposes and principles of the UN Charter.
Walzer positioned Just and Unjust Wars as a challenge to the arguments made
both by realists and by international lawyers within those debates, urging that the
commitment to state sovereignty and the prohibition on the use of force in
international relations must give way in situations where those principles hamper
the defense of human rights or self-determination. (Orford, 2013, p. 83)
After these crises in the 1990s, the Department for International Development in Security
recommended the development of “a more effective international system” in Chapter 5
(UN Charter, 1945). The two points of emphasis were the following:
(a) Since the Cold War, the UN plays a vital role in promoting global security,
and despite taking on a larger role in peacekeeping and peacebuilding, there have
been failings in preventing/stopping ‘large-scale ethnic cleansing and genocide;
and (b) The international community must act to protect ordinary people from
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catastrophic suffering and violence. Although protecting citizens is the primary
duty of each state, the international system must be able to respond when states
fail in their responsibilities to protect ordinary people. (UN Charter, 1945, p. 17)
Shortly after these crises of the 1990s, the ICISS (2001) issued the R2P report to Annan.
This report was designed to address those failings mentioned by the Department for
International Development to protect “ordinary people” from mass atrocities (UN Office
at Geneva, n.d.).
The R2P was universally accepted by the members of the UN at the 2005 World
Summit (UN General Assembly, 2005). At this summit, leaders established the outcome
document. Through the UNSC, the members of the international community will assume
the responsibility to protect through peaceful (i.e., diplomatic) means. When such
peaceful means fail, however, the UNSC must be prepared to take collective action in a
timely and decisive manner, according to the UN Charter (1945).
The major theoretical proposition for R2P is the protection of civilian populations
in failed or failing states, where human rights and human dignity have been violated. The
R2P states that the international community has a duty to the civilians living in failing
states, as opposed to the traditional notion of sovereignty. In addition, the use of force
may be required if all other peaceful means have been exhausted.
The shifting of paradigms from state-centered to individual-centered rights, based
on the common purposes listed in the preamble of the UN Charter (1945), lie at the core
of the R2P doctrine. Grover (2015) argued that the implementation of R2P by threat or
use of force is justified when it is consistent with the purposes of the UN Charter (1945).
It appears that the UN, in accordance with R2P, place the rights of individuals above the
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rights of exclusive state sovereignty, where states have failed or neglected to fulfill their
responsibilities to maintain the international order of peace and security.
In summary, R2P is not only a viable principle; but one which goes to the heart of
the international rule of law, the intent and meaning of the UN Charter (1945) and the
credibility of the UN as a mechanism for the promotion of human rights and the
achievement of international peace and security (Grover, 2015). The current researcher
used the R2P theory as the basis for examining Syria and the use of force, focusing on
Pillar 3 and how the UNSC, through veto power, has failed to achieve consensus on
forceful intervention to stop the mass atrocities and human rights violations in this crisis.
The crisis in Syria continues to be a strain on the international community. If
unaddressed, this crisis is likely to lead to mass migration, internal displacement, and
excessive human rights violations that have breached the peace and security in the region,
subsequently creating instability and chaos within the international system. Theoretically,
the R2P charges individual states and the international community to maintain peace and
security, as outlined in the three pillars of the R2P doctrine and in accordance with the
common purposes of the of the UN Charter (1945). Grover (2015) articulated that all
member states must protect the fundamental rights as stated by the common interests of
the UN Charter (1945). As defined by R2P, Syria should be classified as a failed state.
After exhausting most, if not all, peaceful means to end this crisis, implementing Pillar 3
and allowing the UNSC to use force should have been the next step taken to end the
suffering of the Syrian civilian population. The UNSC established precedence with R2P
in the Libyan crisis. Despite similar circumstances, however, the reaction by the UNSC in
Libya and the subsequent reaction in Syria were different. The researcher examined the
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effects of not implementing Pillar 3 in Syria to protect the civilian population from
further/continued mass atrocities.
The research questions asked the following:
RQ1: Was R2P applied consistently across all modern crisis-related human
endeavors?
RQ2: Did the application of R2P result in negative outcomes?
RQ3: Would a historically consistent application of R2P help alleviate the crisis
in Syria?
The research questions both challenge and build on the policies and procedures of
implementing the R2P doctrine. First, the research questions challenged the existing
protocol of consensus within the UNSC to authorize the use of force. Current UN Charter
regulations only justify forceful interventions for two reasons: (a) self-defense,
individually or collectively, or (b) UNSC authorization of force to maintain or restore
international peace and security. T. H. Lee (2014) referred to this as bifocal orthodoxy,
which denies any role of custom in defining jus as bellum (i.e., right to war).
The R2P created expectations for nation-states to uphold their responsibilities to
provide safety and security to their citizens. If a state manifestly fails in those same
responsibilities, then that responsibility should be assumed by international community.
Additionally, if all peaceful means have been exhausted, then the UNSC’s use of force is
deemed justifiable; this establishes that forceful interventions should not reside only in
cases of self-defense (UN Charter, 1945). Crises that place civilians are at risk due to
mass atrocities and continually disrupt international peace and security, such as the
situation in Syria beginning in 2012, fall under the umbrella of Pillar 3 measures.
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Furthermore, the research questions challenged the UNSC voting process on
authorization to use force, by examining the use of veto power by the P5 members.
Grover (2015) explained that the use of the veto by Russia and China, in the Syrian crisis,
is an act of aggression. Grover contended that the continued abuse of this power allowed
the status-quo to persist in Syria, which is fundamentally against the common interests of
the UN, as stated in the UN Charter’s goal to protect the human rights and dignity and
maintain peace and security. Second, the research questions build upon R2P by
examining additional policies and procedures for implementing R2P. Odeyemi (2016)
suggested that the presence of certain criteria can improve prospects for success. This
author applied this criterion in the Syrian case and to future crises in protecting civilian
populations at risk for mass atrocities. In addition, the research questions build on the
existing theory by analyzing the use of ‘veto power' to prevent collective action by the
UNSC, thereby, allowing crisis of mass atrocities to go unchecked by the international
community. Vanhullebusch (2015) argued for regional forces or other coalitions of the
willing to be authorized to use force to implement no-fly zones, safe zones, and other
limited military strategies, to provide protection. In conclusion, the study, via the research
questions, challenged and build upon the existing theory by examining the bifocal
orthodoxy approach, the voting process, and the use of veto power by the P5 to determine
the implementation of Pillar 3 to protect future populations at risk of mass atrocities.
Conceptual Framework
The researcher examined the concept of an improved implementation of the R2P
doctrine. The R2P doctrine comprises three principles that guide the international
community on protecting civilian populations who are vulnerable to or currently
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suffering mass atrocities. For this study, the concept focused on the failure of the UNSC
to achieve consensus to implement the use of force, specifically in Syria, despite the
crisis reaching an impossible conclusion of peace, without the international community
intervening to protect at-risk populations from mass atrocities. Due to the complexities of
interests by the P5 members of the UNSC, consensus—which is currently a requirement
of Pillar 3 to use force—has not been achieved. Russia and China have opposed any type
of military intervention in Syria. Their opposition stems from the outcomes of the
intervention in Libya. Morris (2013) stated that UNCS members, namely Russia and
China, have used the failings associated with NATO’s means of implementation of force
in Libya, as justification to veto collective action in Syria. Grover (2015) suggested that
by using their veto power, Russia and China have led the UNSC to fail implementing
Pillar 3 by the means necessary to end ongoing mass atrocities, which is an act of
aggression in and of itself (p. 1113). In this chapter, the researcher explores the concept
known as Pillar 3, forceful collective intervention, and examines the complexities
associated within the UNSC to achieve consensus on implementing force in Syria to
protect civilians, which has allowed for the crisis to persist.
Synthesis of the Literature
The R2P is the lens that researchers have used to view the crisis in Libya, which
is similar to the crisis in Syria. Norooz (2015) argued that his article on the intervention
in Libya sheds the light on the crisis through the lens of the R2P. The conflict in Libya
began as a peaceful opposition to the Gaddafi government; however, Gaddafi reacted by
using violence against the opposition, which responded in kind, leading to full armed
conflict. The city of Benghazi—the largest in Libya—fell under the control of the
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opposition leadership, which came to be recognized as the Transitional National Council.
Gaddafi employed his special forces to retake the city using rhetoric on par with rhetoric
uses in the Rwandan crisis. Alarmed by such talk and witnessing the emergence of
human atrocities, regional organizations deemed these crimes against humanity. Norooz
(2015) found that the regimes behavior could amount to “crimes against humanity” (p.
106), and the European Union described this as “a violation of human rights” (p. 106).
The United Nations tried several diplomatic measures to quell Gaddafi's behavior,
including passing Resolution 1970, which acknowledged Libya's responsibility to protect
its citizens; however, Gaddafi continued his attacks. Eventually, the International
Criminal Court (ICC) issued a statement to the regime condemning its actions, and even
found grounds to charge the Libyan Gaddafi regime guilty of mass atrocities crimes. The
ICC was viewed by the international community, particularly the UN, as mirroring R2P.
Ainley (2015) explained that both had comparable purposes: to engage crimes and
atrocities through preventing, protecting, and prosecuting to calm the way international
politics were conducted and to end the impunity. Kofi Annan suggested that the
“expectations of human rights, human dignity, and human life, were to rise above the
traditional concept of state sovereignty” (as cited in Ainley, 2015, p. 37). Consequently,
global recognition of R2P, in the 21st century included the absence of fear and want.
Nevertheless, Ainley concluded that both R2P and the ICC are in crisis. This crisis exists
because of the cost of intervention, insufficient political will, lack of majority support, its
unpopularity, and it is a hard-public sale. These issues have prevented a consensus, which
has legitimatized the deployment of force based on R2P. In an article about the swinging
pendulum, Morris (2013) reinforced this concept by examining the voting conducted on
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implementing Resolution 1973 to intervene in Libya and the ongoing debate on using
force in Syria. Morris (2013) found there was no opposition to the implementation of
Resolution 1973:10 votes for and five abstained. Russia, China, and India, although
acquiescing in the Libya vote, chose to use their veto power in the debate on Syria.
Russia, China, and India have been skeptical of the West's use of R2P as a regime change
strategy. Morris (2013) described their feelings as “embers of long-held suspicions over
trustworthiness of western powers with neo-imperial proclivities” (p. 1280).
In conclusion, there are certain requirements for R2P to be implemented. These
included mass loss-of-life, proper intentions, domestic and regional support, and a legal,
moral, legitimate agent (UNSC) to exercise this concept. Each article specifies a reason
R2P, in concert with the ICC in one article, has failed to live up to expectations. Morris
(2013) suggested that Pillar 3, which identifies the right to use force in exceptional cases
(e.g., Syria), should be removed as an option after acknowledging that “[the] use of force
is a core concept in responding to mass atrocities” (p. 1283). Ainley (2015) explained
how R2P and the ICC should refocus their strategies, even though the UNSC must
address the conflict in Syria. Ainley described both R2P and the ICC as being in crisis,
and by refocusing their strategy on moving toward producing institutions that make
conflict less likely, by promoting good governance, economic prosperity, and state
responsibility, while building better justice systems to deter crimes of mass atrocities.
The conclusions of Norooz (2015) aligned with those of Ainley (2015). Norooz (2015)
suggested a gap in the three pillars, designated by the UN, for state responsibilities, as
missing a fourth pillar. He calls this missing pillar, the responsibility to rebuild. Norooz
(2015) paralleled Morris (2013) in stating that it would be expensive, unpopular, and lack

39
the political will. By not addressing this missing pillar in Libya, critiques of the R2P will
continue. Researchers should address the disarmament, national reconciliation, and the
recovery, as suggested by Norooz (2015). Moreover, the socioeconomic, political, and
environmental drawbacks of intervention may have reduced or eliminated the rise of
terrorist organizations, such as Daesh or ISIS.
Literature Review
The R2P was the theoretical lens this study employed to analyze the crisis in
Syria. The R2P is a three-pillared doctrine designed to hold UN member states to a
certain standard, regarding the safety and security of its citizens. The first two pillars
address prevention by declaring that (a) each sovereign state has a responsibility to
protect civilians within its borders, and (b) the rest of the international community has a
responsibility to ensure that each sovereign state lives up to this responsibility (T. H. Lee,
2014). For the current study, the researcher analyzed the third pillar only. To answer the
research questions, the researcher presented a literature review of a historical background
about the complexities of using force as an intervention tool, especially when there is
non-consensus within the UNSC. Additionally, the researcher examined the inconsistent
application of Pillar 3 by comparing the cases of Libya and Syria. Finally, the researcher
examined the many sides of the R2P debate, as well as the complexities, based on the
legal, moral, and legitimate arguments of implementing Pillar 3 in Syria through the
UNSC.
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Historical Background
The review of the literature revealed the history of the international community as
it relates to the notion of sovereignty and protecting vulnerable civilian populations.
Philosophers Hobbes (1668/2010), Locke (1947), and Bodin (1992) promoted the safety
and security of the civilian populations associated with their respective government
(Shapiro, 2010). Hobbes (1668/2010) was a believer in the right of the individual; the
natural equality of all men, and the artificial character of the political order (Toavs, n.d.).
In Leviathan, Hobbes (1668/2010) stated that the contract that exists between men and
the prevailing authority, only holds true if the authority can provide protection. it is at this
point, when protection cannot be provided, that the contract/agreement is no longer viable
(Shapiro, 2010). When protection cannot be provided, the contract/agreement is no longer
viable (Shapiro, 2010).
Locke (1947) believed that the ruler (authority) only derived their authority from
the consent of the people. Because power is delegated by the people, it can also
legitimately be removed for violating the terms of the people’s trust (Shapiro, 2010).
Furthermore, Locke (1947) reckoned, “The government is the trustee which functions for
and is responsible to the people who create the trust” (p. 46).
Bodin (1992) suggested that sovereignty would remain absolute while in the
hands of the authority (individual or group); however, Bodin also indicated the sovereign
could not confiscate personal property without just cause, thereby seemingly
acknowledging individuals’ rights. Bodin emerged after the threat of Westphalia in 1648
established a new system of political order based on nation-states governed by a
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sovereign (individual or group). This process established a prejudice in international
affairs against interference in another nation’s domestic business. Bodin was considered
the first source on the modern concept of sovereignty (Toavs, n.d.).
Through this analysis of philosophers, it is clear that considerations of individual
rights and their protection, has been a concern throughout history. The literature indicated
sovereignty and the rights of individuals have come into contestation with the concept of
sovereignty. Hobbes not only believed in the notion of absolutism of sovereignty, but he
was also a proponent of the right of the individual and the natural equality of all men
(Toavs, n.d.). Hugo Grotius, considered to have laid the foundations of international law,
argued for the protection of non-combatants during times of war, as well as presupposing
certain fundamental human rights, such as the right to life, food, and medicine (Toavs,
n.d.). In addition, Hugo Grotius argued for what may be considered humanitarian
intervention, he that states might be able to act on behalf of individuals who were victims
“of injuries which … excessively violate the law of nature or of nations regarding any
person” (Apple & White, 2007, para. 2).
In summary, the early notions of sovereignty, based on influential philosophers of
that time, took into consideration the rights of individuals. Locke (1947), Hobbes (2010),
Bodin (1992), and Grotius all mentioned—to some degree—the individual and their place
in the international system of order. Hobbes believed in the natural equality of all men,
while Locke (1947) believed the government should be responsible for and to the people
who created their trust. Grotius—moving forward for the purposes of this study—had the
most influential thinking of sovereignty.
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Grotius (Toavs, n.d.) considered individuals to be actors within the international
society. He wrote extensively on human law, a precursor of what is today known as
international human rights law (as cited in the Apple & White, 2007). Individual human
rights, and how they are perceived, in terms of sovereignty within the international order,
is revealed by the literature in the following sections of the literature review.
There were several related theories to R2P that were analyzed in this study, as
they relate to sovereignty and protecting civilians. Barqueiro et al. (2016) examined
Humanitarian Intervention and Human Security in the historical aspects of trying to
protect civilians from mass atrocities and human rights violations. Bailey (2014)
surmised that the governments, according to customary international law, should act to
prevent mass atrocity crimes and other violations of international humanitarian law (p.
110). Vanhullebusch (2015) compared human security and humanitarianism by
examining how the Arab League could provide military force, while respecting the
fundamental standards of humanity, according to the common purposes and principles of
the UN Charter (1945).
The end of the Cold War ushered in a new era of confronting mass atrocities
associated with genocide, ethnic cleansing, and crimes against humanity. No longer
divided by the polarization created by the alliances of U.S./NATO vs the Soviet
Union/Warsaw Pact, the international community needed to find strategies to confront
these crises, that usually fell along the continuum of this polarization. One example of
this is, the Brezhnev Doctrine, which asserts the Soviet Union’s authority/rights to
intervene in the internal affairs of those states that comprise the socialist bloc
(Romaniecki, 2016). Another example of this was the containment policy of the United
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States (Truman, Nixon, and Reagan doctrines); after World War II, the United States
became fully interventionist. U.S. interventionism was motivated primarily by the goal of
containing the influence of communism (Yoon, 1997).
The Brezhnev Doctrine of intervention to protect the self-determination of
socialist countries in the face of capitalist threats and the Reagan Doctrine advocating the
legitimacy of pro-democratic invasion were met with protest and skepticism (Orford,
2013, p. 94). Gholiagha (2015) stated that following the end of the Cold War, the UNSC
“authorized the use of force to protect the Kurds in Northern Iraq,” becoming the “first
event of shifting politically from a policy of non-interference” (p. 1075). Traditionally,
the intervention into one state’s internal affairs by another state was not an accepted
practice, within the international order. T. H. Lee (2014) suggested that these types of
actions were only taken when a state had a personal stake in the matter, and these states
intervened only on “behalf of its citizens, who were at-risk, or on behalf of its allies, or to
protect its property” (p. 235). As new crises occurred and the international order
collapsed based on polarization, the concept known as humanitarian intervention
emerged. The researcher examines this construct in the following section.
Humanitarian Intervention
There have been numerous attempts to define humanitarian intervention, but there
is no consensus. Hood (2015) stated that although several scholars have attempted to
define humanitarian interventions, “consensus for a universal definition has proven
difficult” (p. 616). Hood (2015) further articulated some examples of these definitions:
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(a) The doctrine of humanitarian intervention is defined as the responsibility
imposed on the international community to protect nationals of another state from
inhumane and cruel treatment within their state, (b) Humanitarian intervention is
meant to protect fundamental human rights in extreme circumstances; it is not
meant to protect or promote civil and political rights, and (c) The use of armed
force by a state (or states) to protect citizens of the target state from large-scale
human rights violations there. (p. 616)
In the context of the current study, the researcher used the working definition of
humanitarian intervention by Blackford (2014), who defined humanitarian intervention as
“the threat or use of force across state borders, without permission, by a state or a
coalition of willing states, aimed at preventing or ending widespread and grave violations
of fundamental human rights” (p. 7).
Humanitarian intervention emerged as the primary strategy to combat mass
atrocities after the end of the Cold War. During the 1990s, several crises were deemed a
threat to the security and peace of the international community. Gholiagha (2015)
contended that the 1990s were characterized by both successes and failures to protect
individual human beings from mass atrocities and severe human rights violations. In
Kosovo, Rwanda, and Somalia, the UNSC adopted resolutions recognizing the need for
interventions based on some type of humanitarian claim. Gholiagha (2015) further
explained the following:
Resolution 794 justified the use of force in Somalia on humanitarian claims. In
Rwanda Resolutions 918 and 925 authorized UN assistance, but fell short to call
the crisis a ‘genocide’ due to the reluctance of the U.S. and some European states.
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In addition, in Bosnia, Resolution 819 which called for the protection of civilians
in the town of Srebrenica, by establishing a safe haven, saw over 7000 men and
boys killed. (p. 1076)
These chains of events started when the UNSC decided to protect Kurdish
civilians in Northern Iraq in 1992. Gholiagha (2015) found that Resolution 767, which
was the first resolution that the security council avowed, ensured that “grave violations
within country or severe emergencies can be evaluated as a threat to peace or
international security” (p. 1075). Saddam Hussein used biological and chemical weapons
on the Kurdish population, thereby causing gross violations of their right to be safe and
secure. Nevertheless, these goodwill actions, did not come without consequences, which
would eventually cause concern within the international community by some states.
Gholiagha found that questions started to emerge from these humanitarian interventions
by the international community and the focus was on consensus. Kosovo, which was a
unilateral act led by NATO, was questioned because it lacked UNSC authorization.
Somalia, where operation Restore Hope advanced humanitarian claims, was unanimously
authorized by the UNSC, but was ran mostly as a NATO operation led by the United
States. In Rwanda, there was little international political will, after the events in Somalia,
and the reluctancy to intervene resulted in genocide against the Tutsis. Orford (2013)
explained that humanitarian intervention is not a doctrine that “responsible states” wanted
to adhere to because it was capable of “uncontrollable abuse” (p. 94). The looming issues
among old rivals of the Cold War began to surface, calling into question the legality and
legitimacy of the doctrine of humanitarian intervention. Orford explained that both the
Brezhnev doctrine and the Reagan doctrine both sought to protect the right to intervene
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on behalf of their social ideological beliefs and were both met with skepticism and
protest. In short, the literature has shown that some emerging states have identified
humanitarian intervention, in terms of imperialism and colonialism. P. K. Lee and Chan
(2016) surmised the following:
Based on the history of abuse by Western powers during the ages of imperialism
and colonialism, where Westphalian ideology of state centered sovereignty in
international relations lie at the center of international relations, humanitarian
intervention should not be used to impose regime change. Colonialism has had an
adverse effect on the reaction, on the use force as an intervention tool, by China
and India. Lee (2015) explained that through their historical trauma and postcolonial colonial identity, “the use of force by powerful states against inferior
states has caused China and India much consternation.” (p. 181)
In Kosovo, Rwanda, and Somalia, the UNSC adopted resolutions recognizing the
need for interventions based on some type of humanitarian claim. Resolution 794
justified the use of force in Somalia on humanitarian claims. In Rwanda, Resolutions 918
and 925 authorized UN assistance, but fell short to call the crisis a ‘genocide’ due to the
reluctance of the United States and some European states. In addition, in Bosnia,
Resolution 819—which called for the protection of civilians in the town Srebrenica by
establishing a safe haven—resulted in the deaths of over 7,000 men and boys (Gholiagha,
2015). In the next section, the researcher examines colonialism and the impact that it has
had on the ideology of the BRICS nations toward R2P.
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Colonialism
Colonialism has had an adverse effect on the ideology of intervention by India
and China. Having been victims of colonialism, both nations have frown upon using
force to intervene in the internal affairs of other sovereign states. Ferdinand explained
that both nations, having formed an Asian axis of sovereignty share similar views on
national sovereignty and human rights, further stating that they “never” vote for
resolutions or motions that are critical of human rights records by other states, calling
them “high priority dissenters” (P. K. Lee & Chan, 2016, p. 386). Earlier, authors
revealed several cases of humanitarian intervention after the end of the Cold War, mostly
by Western powers who have some association with colonialism. China and India, due to
prior experiences, tend to view these interventions in terms of their own interaction with
the West. Miller (2013) explained their encounters with colonialism as a collective
trauma, leading to a deeply ingrained mentality of victimhood and a resultant anticolonial post-imperial ideology. They have attributed their countries “past poverty,
underdevelopment, social disorder, and violence to colonial exploitation and
encroachment” (P. K. Lee & Chan, 2016, p. 180). Colonialism has had an adverse effect
on the reaction of the use force as an intervention tool by China and India. P. K. Lee and
Chan (2016) explained that through their historical trauma and postcolonial colonial
identity, “the use of force by powerful states against inferior states has caused China and
India much consternation” (p. 180).
In sum, colonialism has influenced the ideological view of both China and India
for using forceful intervention as a tool for protecting individuals at risk for mass
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atrocities. Based on the history of their interactions with Western powers, both nations
had an inferiority complex that led to their current ideology on intervention. P. K. Lee
and Chan (2016) argued that present-day China and India would share a “national
identity of post-colonial, re-emerging powers, that were not possessed by other BRICS
nations” (p. 3).
The UN Charter
In this section, the researcher reviews the contestation generated by the UN
Charter (1945) toward the R2P doctrine, as well as the semantics used to justify opposing
points of views of scholars. Grover (2015) suggested the following:
Here follows then a tentative, but perhaps in some ways audacious attempt at just
such semantic gamesmanship in support of R2P as not only a viable Principe; but
one which goes to the heart of the international rule of law, the intent and
meaning of the UN Charter and the very credibility of the UN as a mechanism for
the promotion of human rights and the achievement of international peace and
security. (p. 1112)
As revealed by Grover (2015), the literature was in support of using Article 2 of the UN
Charter for using R2P as a mitigating factor to use force to stop mass atrocities in Syria.
Grover suggested that implementing R2P by force, if necessary, is permissible under the
means permissible per the UN Charter Article 2(4) as it served the purposes set out at
Article (1) and (3) relating to safeguarding the rights and freedoms of the peoples of a
state. These purposes underpinned the sovereignty of that state. Conversely, Stahn (2013)
argued that using force under any condition, as per the UN Charter (1945), would require
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either the notion of self-defense or collective security (consensus within the UNSC).
Regarding Syria, Stahn (2013) stated that humanitarianism was invoked as entitlement to
justify action that is “punitive” in mature, outside the realm of self-defense or collective
security. Grover (2015) and Stahn (2013) had opposing views on Article 2(4) of the UN
Charter (1945).
Article 2(4) stated that all members should refrain in their international relations
from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of
any state, or in any other manner inconsistent with the purposes of the UN (Grover,
2015). Grover (2015) argued that the purposes of the UN were written in Article 1 of the
UN Charter (1945). In Article 1, the UN Charter (1945) stated that to maintain
international peace and security, collective measures should be taken to prevent threats
and other breaches of peace, and these actions should be done in the conformity with the
principles of justice and international law (p. 3). Grover (2015) argued that despite what
Article 2(4) expressed in the form of refraining from using force against another state,
using force in Syria would be inconsistent with the purposes of the UN. Grover suggested
that in the UN Charter preamble—respecting the fundamental human rights of all human
beings—may lead to war in certain circumstances. Grover suggested that armed force
should not be used, saved for the common interest. Grover concluded that this focus on
the “common interests” was justified in the semantics of Article 1 and Article 2. Grover
(2015) explained the following:
The threat to the Syrian people by the Assad regime triggers the pre-existing
‘common interest’ to preserve and protect those human rights; and the fact that
Article 2(4) requires, by implication, that any threat or use of force be consistent
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with the UN Charter purposes and principles which in fact includes protection of
jus cogens norms including those related to fundamental human rights. (p. 1114)
In contrast to Grover (2015), Stahn (2013) alleged that invoking the protection of
fundamental human rights in Syria indicated the humanitarian intervention model is used
to employ the use of force to protect civilians in Syria. Humanitarianism was invoked as
entitlement to justify action that is “punitive” in nature, outside the realm of self-defense
or collective security (Grover, 2015, pp. 1115–1117). Grover (2015) and Stahn (2013)
differed in their interpretations of the UN Charter (1945) and using force. Stahn (2013)
believed in the traditional manner of self-defense and authorization by the UNSC only in
a collective manner to use force against another member. Conversely, Grover was willing
to use keywords (i.e., common interests and purposes and principles) to broaden an
interpretation of when using force could be justified.
Overall, authors have discussed three points of contestations that divided the
international community on using force. First, colonialism influenced the thinking of the
BRICS nations—two of which hold veto power within the UNSC (China and Russia). P.
K. Lee and Chan (2016) concluded the following:
That the shared norm of opposing US hegemonic intervention with a hidden
agenda of regime change is shaped by a “collective historical trauma” and “postimperial ideology” as a result of their painful colonization at the hands of Western
imperialist powers between the eighteenth and twentieth century. (p. 20)
After the end of the Cold War, humanitarian intervention emerged as the primary tool to
combat mass atrocities regarding fundamental human rights issues. Somalia, Rwanda,
and Bosnia were immediate challenges to international peace and security; thus,
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intervening through force was justified under the humanitarian intervention model.
Russia and China, however, became weary of the escalating unilateral action by the West.
Plakoudas (2015) articulated that Putin is striving to transform the international system
into a multipolar world where the United States will share power with Russia and other
powers (e.g., China), rather than operate unilaterally. In addition, researchers have
disclosed that the more powerful states in the West, led by the United States and its
NATO allies, tend to see regime change as part of the intervention strategy, which only
added to the skepticism of the BRICS. P. K. Lee and Chan (2016) explained that because
of their 19th-century historical trauma and common postcolonial identities, powerful
states’ use of force against inferior states has caused China and India much consternation.
The literature showed the interpretation of the UN Charter (1945) has caused
much contestation within the international community. Grover (2015) insisted that such
“sematic gamesmanship” (p. 2) has life-or-death consequences. Conversely, Stahn (2013)
argued that Article 2 indicated, “All members must refrain from using force or the threat
of using force against any state or in any manner inconsistent with purposes of the United
Nations” (as cited in Grover, 2015, pp. 1115–1117). The remaining debate lies in the
interpretations of the purposes of the UN.
The Responsibility to Protect (R2P)
The literature disclosed that the origins of R2P materialized from the
humanitarian crisis that occurred in 1990s, such as Somalia, Rwanda, and Bosnia. These
crises have shown the international community’s failures regarding taking appropriate
actions to protect civilians at risk from these atrocities. Thakur (2013) articulated that
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people in developing countries would suffer if mass atrocities were committed and
outsiders would refuse (or fail) to help, or if geopolitical or commercial interventions
were disguised as humanitarian ones. In 2000, the Canadian government established the
ICISS (2001). The Commission was directed to build a consensus to determine what the
criteria should be for intervention. Discarding the humanitarian intervention label, the
Commission introduced the concept of the R2P. Three components were introduced in
outlining the concept: (a) Responsibility to Prevent, (b) Responsibility to React, and (c)
Responsibility to Rebuild. The Commission sought to answer the questions on
intervention being legitimate. Intervention shifted from a simple right to a right and a
duty to intervene. The ICISS (2001) introduced six criteria for military intervention and
established the UNSC as the ultimate authority to “legitimize such intervention” (p. 1);
however, it did not exclude the possibility of regional organizations or a contingent of
willing powers undertaking this action as well. The R2P emerged from the UN General
Assembly (2005). Having evolved from the concepts of human security and humanitarian
intervention, R2P became the talking point for the UN when it came to protecting
civilians from mass atrocities. Nuruzzaman (2013) stated, “[The] theoretical significance
of the R2P doctrine lies in initiating a paradigm shift from the right of intervention to an
obligation to intervene” (p. 59).
This review of the literature revealed the concept of challenging international
beliefs and of using force as an intervention tool to protect civilian lives. Odeyemi (2016)
professed extensive literature on R2P and Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa
(BRICS) existed, but researchers had yet to engage in the discussion fully for success on
“military intervention for humanitarian reasons” (p. 123). Norooz (2015) explained that
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the international military intervention in Libya was not about bombing for democracy or
killing Muammar Gaddafi. Legally, morally, politically, and militarily, this action has
only one justification: protecting the country’s people (Norooz, 2015). Continuing with
the theme of lacking implementation strategies for using military force to intervene when
protecting civilians—Pillar 3 of R2P—Bellamy (2014) explained the following:
Together, these points suggest that while the use of force and other coercive
measures against states remains controversial, the Security Council’s inability to
reach consensus on a timely and decisive response to the crisis in Syria prior to
2013 stemmed more from considerations derived from the situation in Syria itself
than from more generalized opposition to RtoP provoked by the NATO-led
intervention in Libya. (p. 27)
Summary and Conclusions
Responding with the use of force to address mass atrocities was at the heart of the
R2P doctrine and is the most controversial of the three pillars. Morris (2013) claimed that
even proposals for “soft” Pillar 3 responses to humanitarian crises might meet with
Chinese and Russian disapproval—or at least acquiescence. Hood (2015) concluded that
Article 2(1) of the UN Charter (1945) recognized that sovereignty was not an absolute
bar to intervention if the underlying intent is to prevent human atrocities because human
rights violations raised moral concerns and questions about the very legitimacy of that
sovereignty (p. 613). Hood (2015) challenged those individuals who would argue that the
UN Charter (1945) would call for nonintervention instead of the use of force. Grover
(2015) analyzed the UN Charter (1945) by declaring support of R2P as not only a viable
principle but also one which goes to the heart of the international rule of law, the intent
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and meaning of the UN Charter, and the credibility of the UN as a mechanism for the
promotion of human rights and the achievement of international peace and security. This
debate was the major theme of the literature—using force as an intervention tool—where
there was a lack of strategy, international will, and consensus over the evolving definition
of sovereignty. Grillo and Pupcenoks (2017) tested whether people would believe that
humanitarian interventions should be conducted on a multilateral basis and whether the
United Nations should play a role in that process. The current researcher aimed to address
the gap in literature and extend the knowledge in the discipline by examining the
implementation of Pillar 3 when there is no consensus in the UNSC.
In Chapter 3, the researcher provides details of the methodology used to conduct a
qualitative research study to address the identified gap. Chapter 4 includes the results and
the analysis of the data, implications for positive social change, and recommendations for
future research. Finally, in Chapter 5, the researcher discusses the key points to consider
as conclusion for the study and provides a synthesis of the findings.
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Chapter 3: Research Method
The purpose of this qualitative case study was to examine the implementation of
Pillar 3 of the R2P doctrine in a crisis-related situation, such as Syria beginning in 2012.
This investigation was vital, given that Syria is where mass atrocities continue to disrupt
peace and security within the international arena. In addition, the researcher analyzed the
complexities involved in achieving consensus within the UNSC on implementing Pillar 3,
which allows for the use of military force to protect civilian populations from mass
atrocities. The researcher examined the international system of order, where the UNSC is
seen as the sole actor that maintains peace and security. In accordance with the UN
Charter (1945), this process may be achieved using force, if necessary, to
preserve/protect fundamental human rights based on common purposes and interests.
Furthermore, the goal expanded on the policies and procedures that guide the UNSC’s
decision-making process on using force to stop mass atrocities. This chapter contains the
research methodology and design for the current study. The details include the
participants, instruments, research procedures, data analysis, and ethical considerations.
The researcher conducted this study to answer the following research questions:
RQ1: Was the R2P applied consistently across all modern crisis-related human
endeavors?
RQ2: Did the application of R2P result in negative outcomes?
RQ3: Would a historically consistent application of R2P help alleviate the crisis
in Syria?
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Research Design and Rationale
The researcher used a qualitative case study research design to analyze the
complexities of the process of achieving consensus within the UNSC to implement Pillar
3 and protect civilians in Syria from further mass atrocities. Grover (2015) explained how
the use of veto power by some member states has allowed mass atrocities to continue.
Furthermore, in order to use force to intervene in the internal affairs of a state, the
international community requires the UNSC to collectively authorizes this action, either
by voting for/against or abstaining. The accepted norm within the international
community is not to intervene in the internal affairs of a state unless the state has been
classified as failed/failing according to the first two principles of the R2P doctrine. At
this point, the UNSC can be tasked to vote on a resolution to use force as an intervention
tool; however, there must be a consensus where nine out of the 15 members vote in favor
and there is no veto by a P5 member (Lappin, 2014, p. 143).
The qualitative method allowed for the use a case study approach. The researcher
analyzed the conditions that have led to mass atrocities in Syria and determined how the
Syrian government has failed in its responsibility to protect its citizens. Furthermore, the
researcher explored ways that each P5 member of the UNSC has found that Libyan
civilians have fallen under the protection of Pillar 3—and not the civilians in Syria, even
though they each seem at the same risk level for harm. Patton (2015) found that the first
contribution of a qualitative inquiry would involve a researcher illuminating meanings
and how humans would engage in meaning making (i.e., making sense of the world).
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Role of the Researcher
The role of the researcher for this study was to choose the methodology and
design that best enabled the study to be conducted in an accurate and credible way. The
researcher chose a qualitative case study design as the best method. Patton (2015) stated
that the first contribution of qualitative inquiry involves “illuminating meanings and how
humans engage in meaning making- in essence, making sense of the world” (p. 5). As the
primary research tool, the researcher used the R2P doctrine as the theoretical lens to
conduct research, thereby examining the actions of the P5 members in the UNSC toward
the crisis in Syria. In addition, the researcher employed the R2P doctrine to analyze the
history and evolution of sovereignty and its impact on the international community,
particularly for addressing mass atrocities and fundamental human rights with using force
as an intervention tool. The primary unit of research included the P5 members of the
UNSC, and their interactions and engagements with one another in exercising their
responsibilities to maintain peace and security within the international community
regarding mass atrocities.
The researcher acquired the skills to conduct the research through numerous years
of practical and professional experience with research. The researcher designed this
qualitative case study according to the Institutional Review Board’s (IRB) regulations at
Walden University. The researcher used numerous data bases from various sites/sources
to collect and gather all the data needed. As an observer, the researcher analyzed the
voting records of the P5 members on resolutions put forth by the UN and UNSC to
address the crisis in Syria. The researcher analyzed videos, websites, and other
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documents to identify the actions of each permanent member of the UNSC regarding the
use of their veto power and implementing Pillar 3 in Syria.
The current researcher had no personal or professional relationships with the
participants (P5 members). The participants were representatives of their respective
countries and were assumed to be responsible to their respective governments. Any
personal biases were stated up front in this study and allowed the researcher to own his
perspective, according to Rudestam and Newton (2015). As stated earlier, there were not
any issues with power relationships in this study. The researcher did not have any direct
contact with any of the participants, and only used secondary data to determine the policy
beliefs/actions of each participant about using force in Syria to protect the civilian
population that is at risk for further acts of mass atrocities.
The other potential risks of this study were founded in the institutional bias of the
UNSC, where ideology and alliances skewed documents and other information to fit
narratives of the P5, where contestation exists. These risks included participant biases
(e.g., strategic interests), institutional biases (e.g., the UN’s push to normalize the R2P
doctrine), documents, videos, and websites. These risks may have been purposefully
written to skew the reported results and prove that the use force in Syria is a viable option
in preventing further suffering and harm to the civilian population.
Participant Selection Logic
The population for this study was comprised of the five permanent security
council members: United States, United Kingdom, France, Russia, and China. Although
the UNSC has 15 members at any given time, these five members are the only nations
with permanent status; the other 10 members serve on a rotating basis. The five
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permanent members are endowed with veto power; thus, they can prevent any action or
resolution on collective intervention, as part of the R2P doctrine. The criteria for the
population in this study was to have veto power within the UNSC, and only the five
permanent members have this power. The rationalization for examining this population
was that it only takes one member to prevent the use of collective action or obtaining a
consensus. A comparison-focused sampling strategy was used to review voting records,
analyze video interviews, and examine the strategic interests of each P5 member. The
researcher observed and examined websites and documents that supported each
participant’s view on using force in Syria to protect civilians. Syria was the only case
study used in this dissertation. Syria was a classic case for Pillar 3, based on the criteria
set forth in the R2P doctrine; however, Pillar 3 was not implemented, even though Syria
met all the stated criteria.
For the procedures in this study, the researcher used online research to identify
and analyze each participants actions, statements, and other relevant behaviors on UNSC
resolutions on the crisis in Syria beginning in 2012. Saturation occurred when the
researcher collected all the information on implementing Pillar 3 in Syria, where only the
members of UNSC were viewed as having legal and legitimate authority to collectively
use force to intervene in the Syrian crisis.
Instrumentation
The collected data consisted of observation sheets, videos, and websites where
NGOs such as the Global Centre for the Responsibility to Protect and the Canadian
Centre for the Responsibility to Protect have promoted the implementation of Pillar 3 for
Syria. Archived documents of voting records and proposed resolutions on Syria will be
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analyzed. Observation methods of a non-participatory nature were used to examine and
analyze all information related to the UNSC and the use of force in Syria. The researcher
used a researcher produced observation sheet to analyze voting records on proposed
resolutions by the UN on Syria. In addition, the researcher used sources from three
NGOs: (a) the Global Centre for the Responsibility to Protect (2019), (b) the Canadian
Centre for the Responsibility to Protect (n.d.), and (c) the International Coalition for the
Responsibility to Protect (n.d.). These sources contain videos, interviews, and
presentations on the UNSC and implementing Pillar 3 in Syria. Finally, the UNSC was
used as a source to examine the collective actions of the P5 members on their individual
actions on the Syrian crisis. For the data collection instruments, the researcher used all
the data sources to answer the research questions by showing the complexities within the
system of the UNSC, which did not allow for consensus to be achieved to use force as a
resolution in Syria. The researcher assumed that by using multiple data collection
methods (i.e., triangulation), and validity measures, the content was established. The
researcher used multiple streams of data collection and triangulation to answer the
research question, which contributed to alignment, as well as with reliability and ethical
issues. Finally, the researcher used a qualitative method to attach personal quality to the
research through reflexivity and evaluation.
Procedures for Recruitment, Participation, and Data Collection
As previously mentioned, data were collected from the voting records of the
permanent members of the UNSC with veto power. These records were available through
multiple sources online, as well as on the UN website. The data were made available for
public viewing on how each member voted on all proposed resolutions on Syria. Russia
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has vetoed 12 resolutions on Syria. Only five permanent members of the UNSC exist:
France, United Kingdom, China, Russia, and the United States. These P5 members are
the only members with veto power, and therefore comprised the entire population. Based
on this criterion, this population supplied all the necessary data needed to conduct the
study. The researcher used multiple sources of secondary data for triangulation: The
Global Centre for the Responsibility to Protect, the Canadian Centre for the
Responsibility to Protect, the International Coalition for the Responsibility to Protect, the
ICISS, the UNSC, and the UN General Assembly. The researcher examined these sources
of secondary data to find the policy actions and beliefs of the P5 members on using force
as a policy tool to prevent/stop mass atrocity crimes in Syria. Through informed research,
the researcher also found that qualitative sampling was small and purposeful. Patton
(2015) explained that qualitative inquiry typically focuses on relatively small samples,
even single cases. In sampling purposefully, the researcher intentionally selected a
sample to improve the focus on what was being studied, thereby strengthening the
research. The duration of data collection continued until the researcher reached saturation
from the examination of the various sources. The researcher used a purposive strategy to
collect the data. Patton suggested that the logic and power of purposeful sampling lies in
selecting information rich cases for in-depth analysis. The sample size of this strategy
depended on the purpose of the study, the questions, and the design. All did align to focus
the study and provide information that was thick and rich. According to Patton (2015),
“Purposeful sampling is when information rich cases shine a light on the questions being
studied” (p. 264). Small sample sizes in a qualitative study are often essential, as the
analysis of large datasets could easily become overwhelming. Maxwell (2013) pointed
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out that data for a qualitative study could include virtually anything that a researcher
might see, hear, or that is otherwise communicate to a researcher while conducting the
study. A large sample size, coupled with large amounts of data, would not have provided
the rich thick information needed with purposeful sampling.
Patton (2015) articulated that qualitative inquiry has no rules for sample size, and
it depends on “what you know, what is the purpose, the stakes, the usefulness, the
credibility, and available time and resources” (p. 3). The current researcher employed a
criteria-based strategy of the population for all the data. The population was comprised of
the five permanent security council members with veto power: United States, United
Kingdom, France, Russia, and China. The researcher used a criteria-based strategy to
analyze all available voting records, the members’ ideological beliefs, as well as their
geopolitical self-interests to either employ or not to employ the mechanisms of Pillar 3 to
protect the civilian population in Syria, even though they have been employed in Libya.
The Syrian case was examined in-depth, and the emergent theory of the R2P was used to
analyze the conditions that have led to Syria being labeled as a failed state under the R2P
premise. In addition, the Libyan case was examined briefly to compare why the UNSC
invoked Pillar 3 in Libya and not in Syria, despite many similarities.
The researcher selected cases to compare and to learn about the factors that
explained the similarities and differences of each case, as it relates to R2P (Patton, 2015).
One of the many important aspects of a qualitative research study is the collection of
data. Creswell (2013) noted that qualitative researchers often “learn by doing” (p. 6). The
entire process was iterative, and the data collection was “custom built, revised, and
choreographed” (Huberman & Miles, 1994, p. 20) during this process. The researcher
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employed strategies to organize, collect, manage, and store this information in
completing the dissertation process more efficiently. The researcher used coding as the
primary strategy for this project.
The researcher used coding to develop themes/patterns to create categories on
voting for members of the UNSC. Coding is the process by which qualitative researchers
describe and assign value to the data. Creswell (2013) argued that forming codes or
categories represents the heart of qualitative data analysis. Coding involves taking the
data and forming smaller categories of descriptive information. Qualitative coding
involves the use of a word or a short phrase that summarizes the data. Coding was the
critical link between data collection and their explanation of meaning (Creswell, 2013).
The researcher used evaluation coding as a first cycle coding method to determine the
ideology of each P5 member, and how this has influenced their perspectives on using
force to protect the sovereignty, regarding fundamental human rights and dignity of
civilians in Syria. Coding was used to evaluate the members’ voting records on Syrian
resolutions in the UN. The researcher used pattern codes and themes, specifically
causes/explanations, as a second coding strategy to summarize the findings.
Data Analysis Plan
The researcher used secondary data as the main source of information gathering.
Rudestam and Newton (2015) articulated that secondary data constitute a valid source of
data for a research study, and many excellent studies have been conducted using data that
has previously been collected. Those sources of secondary data comprise online
resources, such as the United Nations Department of Public Information; the United
Nations Regional Information Center for Western Europe; the UNOG Library, Records,
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and Archive Unit; NGOs (e.g., the Global Centre for the Responsibility to Protect and the
Canadian Centre for the Responsibility to Protect); documents (e.g., the UN Charter and
the World Summit Outcome Document); and resolutions from the UNSC, where each
member of the population had a record of their votes on military intervention in crises
like Syria. In addition to obtaining voting records, there were existing video interviews,
conferences on R2P recorded and available for viewing, recorded meetings on UNSC
conferences/meetings, and a wealth of other documents and digital sources from these
secondary sources.
Coding is a process used to organize and make sense of large amounts of
qualitative data (Creswell, 2013). Data analysis in qualitative research comprises a
researcher preparing and organizing the data for analysis; then reducing the data into
themes through a process of coding and condensing the codes; and finally representing
the data in figures, tables, or a discussion. Creswell defined coding as the process by
which qualitative researchers would describe and assign value to the data. In addition,
Creswell found that forming codes or categories is the goal of qualitative data analysis,
and when engaged in coding, the researcher is interpreting and analyzing the data.
The researcher employed this strategy to analyze and explain the data to answer
the research questions by considering similar words and phrases to examine whether
those member states were consistent in their themes when voting on resolutions on cases
other than Syria, or whether their tone differs with each case and their voting position
changes, despite similar conditions. The researcher used journaling to record observations
made while reviewing video content, interviews conducted by NGOs and other
organizations that have a history of discussing R2P, or other archived documents made
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publicly available. The researcher also coded the observational notes from journaling by
looking for similarities and differences in words and phrases in each case and comparing
them with Syria.
In sum, the researcher used secondary data as the main source of gathering
information for the study. The researcher employed two coding strategies to analyze,
describe, and explain the data: descriptive and analytical/theoretical coding. In
descriptive coding, the researcher described what was in the data, and during
analytical/theoretical coding, the researcher developed codes about why what was
occurring in the data might be happening (Gibbs & Taylor, 2005). These two coding
methods allowed the researcher the best opportunity to describe, analyze, organize,
explain, and interpret the data. The researcher used the available tools provided by NVivo
software during the research process. Additionally, the researcher purchased two external
hard drives to store all the research data and serve as the primary backups. The researcher
stored the research throughout a digital network created through the years (i.e., multiple
computer devices, desktop, laptop, and tablet; multiple storage devices, internal drives,
external drives, and USB drives; and cloud storage and email). These strategies enabled
the researcher to complete the data collection and analysis process effectively and
efficiently.
Reliability
Rudestam and Newton (2015) suggested that reliability concerns the replicability
of the study under similar circumstances. The researcher used secondary data that can be
easily retrieved and viewed from online sources listed in the references section.
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Additionally, coding was used to find themes and patterns that arrive at similar
conclusions (Rudestam & Newton, 2015).
To ensure trustworthiness or reliability, the researcher used triangulation.
Maxwell (2013) defined triangulation as collecting data from a diverse range of
individuals and settings, using a variety of methods. The researcher mentioned multiple
sources used above (i.e., UN website, videos, and NGOs), as well as specific methods for
collecting the data (purposeful and comparison focuses sampling) and saturation of the
data collected. Additionally, reflexivity and reactivity were used to address the
researcher’s bias. These biases were stated up-front for the audience to know and
understand. Maxwell explained that eliminating the researcher’s influence is impossible,
but the goal is to understand this influence and use it productively. Finally, the researcher
used prolonged contact or intensive, long-term involvement while engaged in the
observation of the data, videos, interviews conducted online by secondary sources, and
other documents. The researcher observed these repeatedly to determine the varying
viewpoints of different experts on the R2P theory.
Validity
Rudestam and Newton (2015) stated that “all research bears the responsibility of
convincing oneself and the intended audience that the findings are based on critical
inquiry” (p. 131). The process of validation involves presenting a thoroughly sound
research study that is grounded in reliable and credible information. In this study, the
researcher measured validity in terms of the transferability, dependability, and
confirmability of the data; each of these terms are discussed in greater detail below.
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Transferability
Creswell (2013) defined validation as the process of evaluating
trustworthiness, reported observations, interpretations, and generalizations. In
addition, validating an argument or research process means showing it is well
founded and sound, whether the results can be generalized to a larger group.
Conversely, when a procedure or result is reliable, it means that researchers can
depend on it (i.e., rely on it).
The researcher used rich data to provide a detailed analysis of the R2P doctrine,
specifically Pillar 3. Thick description implies the description of behavior as well as the
context that gives it meaning (Creswell, 2013, p. 133). Thus, the descriptions of the
participants or setting under study was sufficiently detailed to allow for transferability to
other settings. The collection of data provided a full picture of the complexities
encountered by the UNSC to implement force in Syria. The researcher used a literary
review matrix for literature collected during the study, and a journal for notetaking for
analyzing videos and websites as secondary data. The researcher used numbers when
examining the voting records of the population. Maxwell (2013) suggested that numbers
can be used to report quasi-statistics, or simple numerical results. Using numbers is an
important quality of the research to analyze the ideological policy beliefs of the
population as they are expressed through their voting record on each resolution presented
on Syria.
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Dependability
To achieve dependability, the researcher used the criteria of adequacy and
appropriateness of the data. The researcher collected, analyzed, and defined data through
saturation. Rudestam and Newton (2015) referred to this process as “adequacy” (p. 133).
The researcher used multiple sources of data to achieve saturation (i.e., voting records of
the P5 members of the UNSC, websites that promote R2P, videos, and other documents).
The researcher used triangulation to ensure dependability. The researcher cross-checked
and corroborated R2P regarding Syria through different NGOs that have promoted the
use of R2P in Syria. The researcher used the Global Centre for the Responsibility to
Protect, the Canadian Centre for the Responsibility to Protect, and the European Center
for the Responsibility to Protect to cross-check and corroborate information and data on
Syria and R2P. Lastly, the researcher used first and second coding to produce reflective
journaling notes.
Confirmability
To ensure confirmability, the researcher employed strategies such as reflexivity,
and contradictions that have resulted in intensive research. Rudestam and Newton (2015)
defined reflexivity as the critical self-reflection component that illuminates the
researcher’s potential biases and assumptions. The researcher kept personal notes on his
thoughts and observations during the study about the potential effects of the data. Finally,
the researcher used triangulation to examine the pros and cons of the R2P doctrine by
using multiple sources. These sources have shown different perspectives of using Pillar 3
(i.e., forceful intervention) in Syria. The researcher examined those perspectives to
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achieve an understanding of the strengths and weaknesses of implementing Pillar 3 in
Syria. Throughout the research, the complexities of implementing or achieving consensus
in the UNSC was discussed, as well as the contradictions of implementing R2P in Libya
and not in Syria. Finally, all data were gathered from secondary sources and confirmed
through online websites, documents, organizations, and video interviews.
Ethical Procedures
The purpose of the IRB was to assure that the potential benefits of the research,
outweigh the potential risks. In addition, the IRB assures the researcher was in full
compliance with all relevant regulations and laws (Rudestam & Newton, 2015). The IRB
ensures that the stakeholders fully consent and are fully informed about any ethical issues
or concerns that could potentially be harmful (Rudestam & Newton, 2015). This
researcher examined the policy and procedures of the R2P as it relates to the third pillar
of the Secretary General's 2009 report (A/63/677; UN General Assembly, 2005). The
researcher examined the conditions in Syria to see why the UN Security Council, due to
multitude of complexities, did not authorize using force in this case, but authorized the
use of force in the Libyan case, despite similar conditions.
The ethical issues of this study primarily reflect the researcher’s bias and
influence toward the data. Merriam (2014) explained that clarifying researcher bias from
the outset of the study was important so that the reader understands the researcher's
position or any biases or assumptions that impact the inquiry. To address this bias, the
researcher took a holistic account of the data. Creswell (2013) explained that by
identifying the many factors and complexities of using force as an intervention tool in
Syria, all the data will paint a larger picture. The researcher introduced these complexities
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throughout the study by examining, analyzing, and reporting the many sides of the Pillar
3/R2P debate. Furthermore, the researcher used inductive and deductive logic to analyze
all data.
The researcher determined that the risks included, but were not limited to, the
assumption of bias due to P5 ideology, geopolitical interests, and history on nation-state
sovereignty versus fundamental human rights. Finally, there were ethical concerns due to
institutional bias, where documents, videos, and websites have been purposefully skewed
to reflect member states’ ideology and geopolitical interests. These interests reported
results to show the use of force was/was not a viable intervention tool to combat mass
atrocities. The benefit of this study expanded or improved the decision-making process,
current policy, and selection to implement Pillar 3 to protect civilian populations who
were at risk of mass human atrocities.
To make sure that this study passed the initial IRB review, the researcher ensured
alignment with Walden's IRB requirements by carefully going over each section of the
IRB application. In addition, the researcher completed the required course work from
CITI to use secondary data for the research study. Because of the nature of the study,
ethical concerns for human participants were not applicable. Furthermore, because all
data collected were already published for public view, there were no ethical
considerations for protection or confidentiality. The researcher enhanced the
confidentiality of the results by using multiple internal/external storage devices, as well
as an external cloud to store all the data used for the research.
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Summary
In Chapter 3, the researcher discussed the methodology of the study, including the
techniques that guided data collection and data analysis. This chapter also included a
discussion of the researcher’s role, the population, and the instrumentation, as well as the
procedures to ensure credibility, dependability, validity, and transferability. Chapter 4
includes a discussion of the results of the data analysis. In Chapter 5, the researcher
presents implications for social change and recommendations for future research based
on the current findings.
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Chapter 4: Results
Introduction
The purpose of this qualitative case study was to examine the implementation of
Pillar 3 of the R2P doctrine. Pillar 3 is an intervention tool used by the United Nations
Security Council (UNSC), when all peaceful means have been exhausted in a crisisrelated situation, such as in Syria during 2012 (Grover, 2015; Kolmašová, 2016;
Vanhullebusch, 2015). This goal is important to address, because Syria has experienced
mass atrocities that continue to disrupt peace and security within the international arena.
As defined in the UN Charter and in accordance with the R2P doctrine, Pillar 3
measures are a last resort option to maintain or restore peace and security within the
international community. For this research, the research questions were leveraged to
address the research problem, as follows:
RQ1: Was R2P applied consistently across all modern crisis-related human
endeavors?
RQ2: Did the application of R2P result in negative outcomes?
RQ3: Would a historically consistent application of R2P help alleviate the crisis
in

Syria?

In Chapter 3, the research design, rationale, validity, and ethical and
methodological considerations were explored and presented. In Chapter 4, the
researcher presents an in-depth discussion of the research setting, demographics, data
collection, and data analysis process. The data collection details include the collection
and analysis procedures used to evaluate actions of the P5 members in the UNSC, the
UN, experts on R2P, NGOs, and all other online resources related to R2P, and
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specifically, the implementation of Pillar 3. Additionally, the researcher examined
relevant existing data on Syria, R2P, and the UN/UNSC resolutions from 2015-2020.
The researcher also highlights categories/codes, themes, and patterns that were revealed
through the analysis and coding process using a software package, Nvivo 12. Finally,
this chapter includes a detailed discussion of the results of this study and how these
results helped to answer the research questions and research problem.
Setting
For this study, the researcher used a purposeful criterion sampling strategy to
collect data from the five permanent members of the UNSC (P5) because they have veto
power. This veto power enables each of the permanent five members to nullify any
resolutions or actions proposed by the UNSC. The research was conducted using
secondary data to answer the research questions; therefore, there were no direct factors or
influences effecting the population, or the results that were analyzed and interpreted.
Upon receiving approval from the Walden Institutional Review Board (IRB), the
researcher began the online collection of data from the five permanent members of the
UNSC on resolutions concerning the crisis in Syria, beginning in 2012. Additionally, data
was collected from three NGO’s, who specialize in R2P. Other online sources were used
that provided videos, interviews, and documents related to answering the research
questions. Finally, the researcher used additional online websites such as the Global
Policy Forum and the Global Center on Cooperative Security to collect, examine, and
analyze data for the purpose of answering the research questions and addressing the
research problem.
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Demographics
The researcher selected a criterion-based purposeful sampling strategy to identify
the members of the UNSC that could single handedly prevent the UNSC from acting in a
decisive manner (employing force) to prevent or stop mass atrocities. The UNSC is
constructed around the P5 (permanent members of the UNSC). As previously mentioned,
the P5 is comprised of the United States, the United Kingdom, France, Russia, and China.
These five nations were allies during World War II, and they possess the world’s top five
nuclear arsenals. Because each of these nations are endowed with the power to
unilaterally reject any proposed resolutions or actions put forth by the UNSC, and thus
nullify any attempts at consensus (i.e., veto power), they were the focus of this study. The
researcher examined the Libyan crisis as a source of reference because it is the only case
on record to employ Pillar 3 through a consensus in the UNSC. All the data collected for
this study revolved around these five nations which held veto power. The researcher
collected data from experts on R2P, NGOs, and other documents pertaining to R2P.
The implementation of Pillar 3 of the R2P doctrine is solely dependent on the P5
members coming to a consensus. Figure 1 shows the deep division within the UNSC,
particularly the P5, at the beginning of the Syrian crisis in 2012. The chart not only shows
the failure of the UNSC to adopt a resolution condemning the Assad regime of violently
suppressing anti-government demonstrators, but it previews how the division within the
UNSC continues to this day, preventing the implementation of R2P, and resulting in the
continued pain and suffering for those civilians at risk for mass atrocities, particularly in
Syria.
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Figure 1
UNSC Voting Members on UN Resolution in 2012

Note. Retrieved from https://govindicators.org.
In addition to collecting data from the P5, data were also collected from three
NGOs that advocated for and employed experts on the R2P doctrine. These were the
Global Centre for the Responsibility to Protect, the Canadian Centre for the
Responsibility to Protect, and the International Coalition for the Responsibility to Protect.
The Global Centre for the Responsibility to protect was established in 2008, and its
mission statement is to make R2P a reality by advocating and advancing R2P around
three specific principles: (a) clarifying R2P, (b) advocating for R2P implementation, and
(c) strengthening and institutionalizing R2P (GCR2P, 2019). The Canadian Centre for the
Responsibility to Protect (n.d.) is based out of the University of Toronto; it is “a nonprofit, non-partisan research organization which aims to promote scholarly engagement
and political implementation of the R2P principle” (http://ccr2p.org/mandate, para. 1).
The International Coalition for the Responsibility to Protect (n.d.) was founded in 2009
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by representatives of eight regional and international NGOs; their mission is to bring
together coalitions of NGOs, regionally and internationally, to promote consensus for
R2P.
Dr. Simon Adams, Executive Director at the Global Centre for the Responsibility
to Protect and an expert on the R2P doctrine, conducted online video interviews, spoke at
conferences on R2P and the Syrian Crisis, and published articles on R2P, where his
analysis and expertise contributed to answering the research questions, while addressing
the research problem. The Canadian Centre for the Responsibility to Protect, the
International Crisis Group, the International Coalition for the Responsibility to Protect,
and the Global Policy Forum each published articles, held conferences, and participated
in international events focusing on the R2P doctrine. Additionally, each NGO
participated at conferences held by the UN General Assembly on the importance of R2P
and its role in protecting vulnerable populations to maintain international peace and
security.
Data Collection
After receiving approval from the IRB (01-23-20-0151870), the researcher began
the collection of secondary data by examining sources online. The researcher started with
searching the UN website for all available articles, videos, and previously recorded
interviews and conferences that pertained to Syria and the R2P doctrine. Upon examining
the UN website, the researcher found a link that specifically referenced the UNSC, and
then searched the UNSC page for resolution pertaining to Syria. Several resolutions were
found, but the researcher focused on those from the past 5 years. The researcher
identified only one resolution—Resolution Resolution 2209 (2015)—that referenced
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collective forceful action under Chapter 7 of the UN Charter. The United Nations
Security Council Resolution 2209 condemns any use of chemicals as a weapon in the
Syrian Civil War and threatens to use force if chemical weapons are used again in the
conflict. The resolution was passed with 14 in favor, with one abstention from Venezuela
(UN Security Council, 2015). The representative from Venezuela stated:

He had abstained because the vote prejudged the results of the ongoing OPCW
investigation. That inquiry should first conclude, to determine
responsibility. Syria was a victim of armed groups that fueled hatred and
violence, and that also had major military capacity (www.un.org, 2015, para. 6).

The researcher continued to conduct an exhaustive search for resolutions related
to Syria and R2P (Pillar 3) from 2015 to 2020 but could not find any other resolutions
that addressed the use of force as a viable option or discussed any military options under
chapter 7 of the UN Charter. The researcher used Resolution 2209 as the lone indicator
for analyzing the UNSC and how they approached the use of force as an intervention tool
in Syria. In addition to searching for Syrian resolutions on the UN website, the researcher
used the Google Scholar search engine to search for Syrian resolutions by the UN/UNSC
from other online sources, including documents, charts and tables, and videos. The
researcher examined and analyzed 16 resolutions from 2015 to 2020 that were voted on
in the UNSC concerning Syria. Outside of Resolution 2209, mentioning Chapter 7
options for using chemical weapons by the Assad regime against Syrian civilians,
Resolution 2249 called for member states to take all necessary measures to combat
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terrorism within Syria. This call to action, however, was not deemed a collective
organized military action under Pillar 3. Figure 2, retrieved from the UNSC website,
illustrates the most recent resolutions that have prompted the use of veto power by each
of the P5 members.
Figure 2
Issues that have Prompted the Most Vetoes in the UNSC

When Syria is the lone issue, Russia and China have used their veto power exclusively.
Figure 2 also demonstrates the deep political/ideological divide within the UNSC and
why consensus on R2P/Pillar 3 has been an impossible conclusion. Additionally, the
division within the UNSC is displayed in Figure 2, where it shows Russia and China are
aligned on most of the issues presented in Figure 2, and the U.S., France, and the U.K.
are also aligned. The polarization of the UNSC, as stated early in the study between those
two factions (P3 vs P2), is illustrated in figure 2. Therefore, making consensus non-
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existent, particularly on issue dealing with Syria, where Russia and China are the only
nations to use their veto.
Next, the researcher searched previously mentioned NGO website for interviews,
statements, conferences, and other documents created by experts. Dr. Simon Adams of
the GCR2P spoke at several conferences held on R2P and conducted interviews on the
doctrine, specifically mentioning the Syrian Crisis and the need for the international
community to fulfill its responsibilities to the Syrian people using the guidelines of R2P.
Additionally, several published videos, articles, and statements were found on the
UN/UNSC websites where the failures of R2P were examined and discussed amongst
experts. The pros and cons of military intervention, the impact of Russian and Chinese
veto’s in Syria, the lessons learned from intervening in Libya, and the future of R2P were
the subjects analyzed. Furthermore, the websites of the following were to collect data: the
Canadian Centre for the Responsibility to Protect, the International Crisis Group, the
International Coalition for the Responsibility to Protect, and the Global Policy Forum, all
provided critical information on the Syrian crisis and R2P. Some of this information
included comments and analysis on R2P from previous UN Secretary General’s Ban Kimoon and Kofi Annan, as well as current Secretary General Antonio Guterres. The case
for military intervention was examined, along with the legal foundations of intervening
under R2P in a nation with a recognizable functioning government. Finally, data was
collected and analyzed on the general philosophy of R2P moving forward. Preventive
diplomacy was examined by Dr. Adams where he focused in on the first two principles of
R2P, when conducting interviews. Articles that emphasized R2P 2020, where UN
member states were called on to embrace the five policy priorities of: Prevent; Protect;
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Resist; End Impunity; and Empower. The researcher concentrated on those secondary
sources that referenced R2P, Syria, and Libya. However, the researcher did find several
videos and other documents with experts discussing the failure of the UNSC to take
appropriate action pertaining to R2P in Syria. Finally, the researcher analyzed documents
that outlined and discussed military intervention, preventive diplomacy, and the
selectivity of using or implementing Pillar 3.
Data Analysis Plan
As previously mentioned earlier in this study, Creswell (2013) stated that data
generated by qualitative methods are voluminous and can be overwhelming. As indicated
earlier in the data analysis plan in Chapter 3, the researcher used NVivo 12 to assist with
collecting, organizing, coding, and storing the data for this study. NVivo was used as the
primary mechanism to analyze, code, and determine themes/categories/patterns.
Additionally, all videos, documents, interviews, and observations were imported to
NVivo, where they were assigned a category by file name, and subsequently analyzed
under nodes created by the researcher to code the data.
The researcher then coded the data using the coding tool under NVivo 12 by
creating nodes to describe the data. Miles et al. (2014) suggested that “a descriptive code
assigns labels to data to summarize in a word or short phrase…eventually providing an
inventory of topics for indexing and categorizing” (p. 73). Each node was given a name
to code the data. The researcher created five nodes to code the data, where the researcher
looked for similar words, phrases, and ideological beliefs on sovereignty, human rights,
intervention, and R2P. The researcher then analyzed the documents by highlighting,
within each article, the words, and phrases that the researcher found to be similar within
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each node and then were coded. Additionally, the researcher transcribed the videos where
experts from NGOs were interviewed or were discussing R2P as part of a
panel/conference. The researcher created observation sheets on some of the videos and
photos where there was no narrator. Finally, the researcher used NVivo 12 to create word
trees, word clusters, and charts from the data. This data included the using key words and
phrases such as: Syrian resolutions, failure of R2P, humanitarianism, military
intervention in Syria, UNSC and R2P, UNSC and Libya, UNSC and Syria, R2P, the
Responsibility to Protect, UN mandates on military intervention, UNSC voting patterns
on R2P, and the UN Charter and R2P. Observations sheets were created from the analysis
of videos, articles, and documents found on various websites, including GCR2P, and the
CCR2P: (1) The ACT Code of Conduct and the UN Security Council, (2) R2P 5 years 5
vetoes, Simon Adams on R2P, Syria, and the reform of the Security Council, (3) Syria:
Nine Years of Atrocities, Impunity, and Inaction, and (4) 6 key point of military
intervention in Syria.s
The five nodes/codes are as follows. Under the node of UN/UNSC resolutions
from 2015-2020, the researcher was looking for all the resolutions that were brought forth
on the Syrian crisis during this specified time-period. The researcher found 11 such
resolutions that addressed the crisis in Syria. As previously mentioned in the Data
Collection Section, only two of those resolutions—2118 and 2209—directly mentioned
any collective action under Chapter 7 of the UN Charter, thus suggesting implementing
Pillar 3 of the R2P doctrine. Under the node of military intervention, the researcher
imported documents, charts, videos, and articles discussing or examining calls for and
against using force as tools for intervention in the Syrian crisis. The third node was
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interview and analysis of experts concerning the R2P doctrine. The researcher examined
the NGOs’ websites, UN/UNSC conferences on R2P, and videos interviewing Dr. Simon
Adams, Kofi Anan, and others who spoke to the principles of R2P, and the complexities
of implementing the R2P doctrine. Under the fourth node, international peace and
security, the researcher examined data that discussed the purposes of the UN, as the
accepted entity of the international community, that has the legal, legitimate, and moral
authority to maintain peace and security. Finally, the use of diplomacy was examined
within the data to justify if the use of force was warranted under Pillar 3 of the R2P
doctrine. Pillar 3 is a last-resort option, as stated in the doctrine of R2P, and all measures
of diplomacy should be exhausted before measures under Pillar 3 are considered by the
UN/UNSC.
In summary, the researcher created five nodes to code all the data collected and
analyzed to answer the research questions. The node/codes were placed into categories,
where themes/patterns were revealed. These themes/patterns consisted of: (a) the use of
veto power by P5 members in the UNSC to protect their national interests; (b) the failure
of R2P, specifically in Libya and the effects of implementing pillar 3 after Libya; and (c)
inaction by the UNSC in Syria based on the failures in Libya.
Evidence of Trustworthiness
Patton (2015) declared that the challenge of qualitative analysis lies in making
sense of massive amounts of data; therefore, in this qualitative case study design, the
researcher employed triangulation strategies to analyze the secondary data that was
examined from all available online sources listed in chapter 2. The researcher shared the
results within this study through various measures (i.e., charts, tables, quotes from

83
experts, and summations of observations/transcripts). The researcher examined and
analyzed secondary data from multiple sources and specified the methods for collecting
the data until determining that saturation had occurred. Finally, the researcher engaged in
an exhaustive and prolonged research of the data, including watching/observing videos,
reading documents, taking notes on interviews by experts on R2P, and analyzing
resolutions from the UNSC/UN on R2P. This was repeatedly done in an intensive manner
to experience different points of views on R2P.
Transferability
The researcher provided thick description of the data, first by coding the data
collected to develop themes by associating themes, which were used to answer each
research question. The data collected painted a full picture of the complexities involved
in achieving consensus within the UNSC to implement Pillar 3. The researcher used all
the resources stated in Chapter 3 and did not deviate from the research methodology;
therefore, transferability remains viable.
Dependability
The researcher achieved saturation of the data through the coding process. The
researcher collected, analyzed, defined, and coded the data until themes/patterns were
revealed in the results, and repeated. Multiple sources were used from online resources
(e.g., UNSC/UN websites, NGO websites, online interviews, conferences, videos, other
documents). Triangulation was implemented to ensure dependability (interviews by
different experts, different perspectives of using force as an intervention tool, and
analysis of ideology of implementing pillar 3 in Syria based on P3 vs P2 in the UNSC),
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and the results were shared through tables, charts, quotes, and experts’ analysis. First and
second coding techniques were used to determine nodes within NVivo, which helped to
analyze the data and provide themes. Finally, the researcher used journaling and
transcription to create tables summarizing the findings.
Confirmability
The researcher ensured confirmability by utilizing the strategies stated in Chapter
3. The researcher used multiple sources to reveal the results provided by the data. Pillar 3
was analyzed and examined by all relevant secondary sources from the UNSC, experts,
NGOs, and all other documents related to R2Pin the modern era. Different perspectives
were reported in the results, as evidenced in the tables, charts, and quotes presented in the
findings. Also, the researcher examined Libya as the sole case of implementing Pillar 3
by the UNSC. The Libyan case was used to examine the complexities of applying R2P,
which have resulted in inaction in Syria, despite their similarities. Finally, the data
reported in the results are from all the secondary sources stated throughout the study and
are therefore confirmable through those online resources.

Results
The results of this study are presented in the sections below. The findings from
the data are separated according to each research question, and the themes that were
revealed from the coding of the data are presented using the previously mentioned
secondary sources. These secondary sources, after conducting the data analysis process,
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revealed three major themes, mentioned above, that were purposefully organized by the
researcher to align each research question with each theme.
Research Question 1
RQ1 asked: Was R2P applied consistently across all modern crisis-related
human endeavors? The theme that emerged to answer this question, was the constant
use of the P5’s veto power—particularly the United States, Russia, and China—to
protect their national interests/security. First, the researcher would like to define, for
this study, the timeline for R2P in terms of modern crisis-related human endeavors.
Earlier in this paper, the researcher mentioned the crises of the 1990s. These crises,
which included Kosovo and Rwanda, were undertaken under the banner of
Humanitarian Intervention (HI) Although R2P evolved from HI, the R2P doctrine
established principles that held nation-states primarily responsible for the protection of
their citizens. Sovereignty is seen as two-fold (state versus the individual).
Humanitarian Intervention placed emphasis on nation-states rights, while R2P places an
emphasis on individual rights, and, therefore, challenges the old norms of sovereignty
when it comes to addressing mass atrocities. Dr. Simon Adams (2017) articulated the
following:
I do not believe in humanitarian intervention. There was a lot of time, political
sweat, pain, and suffering behind the great humanitarian intervention debates of
the 1990’s. R2P essentially came out of the attempt to develop concepts and
way’s which transcend the old mentality of humanitarian intervention. This is an
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important point of distinction. I do not think the two are interchangeable. R2P
transcends humanitarian intervention. (pp. 1-2)
Additionally, Lopez (2015) stated that humanitarian intervention, which involves the use
of armed force to protect civilians at risk of mass crimes, has generated a great deal of
controversy due to major failures in the 1990s and questions regarding the effectiveness,
motivations, legality, and legitimacy of interventions (p. 122).

For the purposes of

analyzing and interpreting the results of this study, the R2P framework is only applicable
to those crises that meet the criteria of the four core mass atrocity crimes (genocide, war
crimes, crimes against humanity, and ethnic cleansing), after the 2005 World Summit
Meeting, where the R2P doctrine was universally adopted by all member states in the
UN.
Figure 1 in the demographics section of this chapter revealed the deep division
within the UNSC at the beginning of the Syrian crisis in 2012. This figure illustrates the
division by pointing out the use of ‘veto power’ by Russia and China on matters
concerning intervention and R2P, after Resolutions 1970 and 1973 invoked the use of
force in Libya. The chart further showed the polarization between the United States,
France, and United Kingdom (P3) and Russia and China (P2) based on the use their veto
power to protect their interests in the Middle East. Unfortunately, this trend has continued
to impede the UNSC’s ability to invoke or implement the principles of R2P in many of
the crises that have emerged since Libya. Lopez (2015) indicated that many have
questioned the wisdom and effectiveness of the intervention. Lopez (2015) further
suggests in an interview with Thomas Friedman (2015), that for the UN to renew hope in

87
the future of R2P, it must address the failures of R2P in Libya (pp. 119-138). Libya was
the first and only case to achieve a consensus in the UNSC to invoke Chapter 7 measures.
In When the UNSC fails, the UN fails (GCR2P, 2016), the video begins with the
inscription that P5 members of the UNSC have the right to veto but with this also comes
responsibility to provide alternative options. Suggestions were made by the following
individuals with professional knowledge, experience, and expertise: (a) Mary Robinson,
Elder, former President of Ireland, and former UN High Commissioner for Human
Rights, articulated that the UNSC was setup to be the leader on peace and security, and
when it fails, the consequences are terrible. (b). Salil Shetty, Secretary-General of
Amnesty International, explained that the UNSC was created to prevent mass atrocities,
unfortunately, they have consistently failed the world from Rwanda to Syria. (c). Kofi
Annan, Chair of the Elders, and former UN Secretary-General, stated:
That it should be incumbent upon a member state, if it uses a veto, to present an
alternative. You cannot put down a veto, paralyze operations creating a stalemate
and not propose a way forward. When they are divided and cannot agree on a
resolution, the crisis tends to fester. (GCR2P, 2016, p. 52).
The data revealed, after the Libyan crisis, that the tone of Russia and China
changed dramatically in terms of using R2P, particularly Pillar 3 measure (2016)
suggested that there were different outcomes in the UNSC for Libya and Syria. The
practical implications of the situation in Libya (i.e., no national/strategic interests by
China and Russia, no regional support for the Gaddafi regime, etc.) allowed for
consensus, abstentions by Russia and China, to allow for military intervention. The
opposite was true for Syria; therefore, no consensus was achieved. Furthermore, after the
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intervention in Libya leading to regime change, the Russians and the Chinese began to
think of R2P, particularly Pillar 3, as a tool for Western imperialism. Lee and Chan
(2016) concluded that China and India’s response to the Crisis in Syria was based on the
history of abuse by Western powers during the ages of imperialism and colonialism (pp.
180-181). Moreover, to illustrate China’s selective attitude toward Pillar 3, in 2011-2012,
When the UNSC was debating to invoke Chapter 7 of the UN Charter to endorse military
intervention in various countries in Africa and the Middle East (Cote d’Ivoire, Libya,
Mali, and Syria), China acquiesced in all cases except in Syria (Lee & Chan, p. 179).
After abstaining to vote against intervention in Libya and understanding how NATO
changed the mission from protecting civilians into regime change, Russia has since made
every effort to block all UNSC resolutions on Syria that has been put forth by the United
States and NATO. The following is a summary that Odeyemi (2016) provided on
Russian/Chinese vetoes at the beginning of the Syrian crisis:
In October of 2011, Russia and China vetoed a resolution that condemned Syria’s
crackdown on anti-government forces. In February of 2012, they vetoed a
resolution proposed by the League of Arab States, supporting a peace plan calling
for a cease in violence. In July of 2012, Russia/China vetoed a resolution calling
for Chapter VII measures demanding the Syrian government stop hostilities or
face sanctions. Finally, in May of 2014, they vetoed a resolution referring the case
in Syria to the International Criminal Court (ICC). (p. 136)
The data presented by Odeyemi (2016) suggested a trend by the Russians and Chinese—
with the support of India, Brazil, and South Africa—to contest the other permanent
members of the UNSC in Syria. Odeyemi (2016) further suggested that the BRICS
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(Brazil, Russia, India, China, & South Africa) nations were ubiquitous in recent debates
as a symbolic counterbalance to Western dominance of the international order (p. 128).
Lopez (2015) cited Genser’s statement that “Western powers made a huge mistake by
pivoting so rapidly to regime change, which wasn’t justifiable under R2P and wasn’t
justifiable under the resolution” (pp. 228-229). To date, Russia—with the backing of
China—has vetoed 14 UNSC resolutions on Syria since the beginning of the conflict.
Averre and Davies (2015) suggested that the Russians felt that R2P should focus entirely
on the first two pillars as a means of protecting vulnerable populations. Pillar 3 was
viewed as a tool for the West to promote democracy and regime change. They ultimately
concluded, however, that the Russian position was hypocritical when it came to using
force, as an intervention tool, in Crimea and the Ukraine when it suited their interests.
Russia has blocked 13 resolutions primarily concerning humanitarian efforts to ease the
pain and suffering of Syrian civilians. As previously mentioned, Resolutions 2118 and
2209 were the only resolutions that called for Chapter 7 and Pillar 3 measures to be
applied in case of continued chemical weapons use/attacks by the Assad regime. Table 1
illustrates the vetoed resolutions on Syria and the nations who did not support each of
these resolutions (Russo, 2017).
Additionally, as seen in Table 2, Russo (2017) enumerated resolutions passed in
Syria. Many of the resolutions align with Russian interests, backed by China, to try and
maintain the sovereign integrity of the Assad regime over Syria. This data revealed the
inconsistencies of the implementation of Pillar 3 in modern related crises. Political
interests, ideology, and national security concerns have created complex conflicts and
polarization within the UNSC, where Libya has been the only modern-day crisis to
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receive a vote of consensus to use force as an intervention tool. All other crises have
failed to achieve consensus, because of the use of the veto. Cote d’Ivoire, Libya, Mali,
Crimea, Ukraine, Myanmar, and Syria all have fallen victim to the UNSC’s failure to
consistently apply R2P when civilians have the potential to become the victims of mass
atrocity crimes. The use of the veto has led to a pattern of non-consensus within the
UNSC to uphold its obligation to maintain international peace and security. Russia’s and
China’s use of their veto power to stall action has resulted in the continuation of mass
atrocities, specifically in Syria. The Global Centre for the Responsibility to Protect
(2020) concluded that:
Throughout the past nine years the UN Security Council has consistently failed to
uphold its responsibility to protect the Syrian people. Fourteen vetoes by Russia
(including eight with China) have undermined international efforts to hold
perpetrators on all sides accountable for war crimes and crimes against humanity
(p. 1).
Salil Shetty (2016), Secretary-General of Amnesty International, has called for the P5
members of the UNSC—particularly the United States, Russian, and China—to stop
using the veto to protect themselves and focus on protecting civilians who are dying in
large numbers. Further, he stated that, it is high time that these governments put the
protection of people over their narrow political interests (GCR2P, 2016, 2.53). Lopez
(2015) articulated that:
Ultimately… decisions about intervention will continue to be made in an ad hoc
fashion by political leaders balancing national interests, legal considerations,
world opinion, perceived costs, and humanitarian impulses – much as they were
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prior to the advent of R2P. (pp. 119-138)
The use of the veto has led to R2P being applied inconsistently by the UNSC (P5). Their
national political and security interests have led those members, particularly the United
States, Russia, and China, to apply their veto power in a contradictory manner in some
modern-day crises in parts of Africa and the Middle East.

Research Question 2
RQ2 asked: Does the application of R2P result in negative outcomes? The theme
associated with answering this research question was, the failures of R2P after Libya. The
examination of the data for the Libyan crisis was used to answer this research question.
Libya was the only case where R2P, specifically Pillar 3, had been applied. Resolution
1973 was adopted on March 17, 2011, authorizing the use of all measure necessary to
protect civilians, including establishing a no-fly zone. Ten UNSC members voted on this
resolution, with five members abstaining. More importantly, there were no votes against
the resolution by any of the P5 members, and thus consensus was achieved. This allowed
for Pillar 3 to be implemented for the first time under the UNSC. Lopez (2015) stated that
the Libyan case remains an anomaly as the only Arab Spring uprising that sparked swift
action by the international community and led to an armed intervention (p. 3). The UNSC
has failed to act in any other crisis, meeting the requirements of pillar 3, with forceful
intervention.
Libya was the most frequently used word in this theme. Of the 13 files/nodes,
and 31 references coded in this theme, Libya or Libyan was mentioned more than 70
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times. Syria or Syrian was the next most frequently used word, at 40 times. Nevertheless,
Libya is the only case where Pillar 3 was legally and legitimately employed to protect
civilians who were at risk for mass atrocities. Feikes (2017) articulated that the U.S. and
NATO intervened in Libya in 2011 due to fears of a massacre of innocent civilians in
Benghazi at the hands of dictator Muammar Gaddafi. Gareth Evans (2002, as cited in
Lopez 2015), one of the architects of the R2P doctrine, stated that “the campaign in Libya
has done grave, possibly even irreparable, damage to R2P’s prospects of becoming a
global norm” (pp. 119-138). The data continued to reveal, through the failure of R2P,
additional analysis of documents on the effects of R2P in Libya. Peta (2017) suggested
that R2P is inherently problematic, indicating that states do not intervene to stop/prevent
human suffering, but rather to achieve a strategic objective. Peta (2017) continued to
suggest that once a state intervenes and achieves their strategic objective within a
country, they have no obligation to stay and help rebuild, and thus can leave the country
in even worse shape than prior to intervention. Peta’s analysis confirms that the
application of R2P has created some negative outcomes, specifically in Libya as the lone
case for the implantation of the R2P doctrine (Peta, 2017).
After the United States and its NATO allies achieved their strategic objective of
protecting Libyan civilians and then reverting to regime change, under the veil of R2P,
they abandoned the newly installed government of Libya without the necessary political
and socio-economic foundations to prevent chaos from returning. Peta (2017) declared
that in achieving their strategic objective, NATO dismantled Libya’s state apparatus and
left the country in a more vulnerable position than it was under Gaddafi’s rule. As a result
of NATO’s intervention, Libya is now on the verge of genocide. Table 3 is a summation
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that the researcher created from the analysis of experts on R2P and its failures in Libya.
Table 3 illustrates how each of these individual experts express how the
application of R2P eventually failed the Libyan people, resulting in negative outcomes,
which have left Libyan civilians in a worse position than before the R2P mandate. In a
personal interview, Genser (2012) articulated:

The ethicality of the intervention under R2P extends beyond Gaddafi’s fall to the
trends in post-war Libya, where there have been few positive developments. Since
the end of the war in October 2011, Libya has been plagued by economic
instability, widespread violence and insecurity and threats to political transition
processes (p. 12).

The application of R2P, specifically Pillar 3, in Libya initially fulfilled its stated
goals. When those goals were averted into regime change, however, the international
community—led by those states who are permanent members in the UNSC and NATO
allies (United States, France, and United Kingdom)—failed to apply what many R2P
experts are now touting as the fourth pillar; the Responsibility to Rebuild. Duncan
Pickard, nonresident fellow with the Atlantic Council’s Rafik Hariri Center and former
Libya country director for Democracy Reporting International, observed that unlike its
neighbors, this country had to effectively start from scratch: “Libya had nothing to work
with – no institutions to draw from, no legal continuity with the past.” (Lopez, 2015, p.
131). Additionally, Mattia Toaldo of the European Council on Foreign Relations
suggested that support for Libya’s transition was limited and should have included efforts
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to build the legitimacy of institutions and political actors, promote reconciliation among
former combatants, encourage national dialogue and address the worsening economic
conditions (Lopez, 2015, p. 131). Nevertheless, the pattern of R2P failures laid out by
these individual experts has provided detailed evidence of the negative outcomes that
have befallen Libya, which is the only case, where R2P has been applied by the UNSC.
Two nodes/codes were created in Nvivo to analyze articles, interviews, and
videos of experts and their analysis of the impact of R2P in Libya. The themes that were
analyzed consisted of: (1) the failure of R2P and (2) the inconsistent historical application
of R2P. Individual analysis of statements by selected experts were highlighted in Nvivo,
where word clouds and word trees were examined. Table 3, a Summation of R2P and its
Failures in Libya, was created by the researcher as an illustration, concluding the analysis
of a few experts on how R2P failed in Libya.
Research Question 3
RQ3 asked: Would a historically consistent application of R2P help alleviate the
crisis in Syria? The theme provided by the data was inaction by the UNSC in Syria from
2015 to present. Furthermore, the data provided evidence that R2P has not been applied
consistently since its inception in 2005. While analyzing the data to answer the first
research question, it was revealed that overall, R2P has not been consistently applied
through all modern- day crises. The use of the ‘veto’ provided evidence that after Libya,
the UNSC has failed to reach a consensus to fully apply R2P on any case, particularly
Syria, with consistency.
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The BRICS nations (Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa) have used
their regional influence, as well as the veto powers of Russia and China to foster inaction
within the UNSC, consequently, resulting in the continuation of pain and suffering for
Syrian civilians. Lee and Chan (2016) professed that both Russian and China tend to
reject U.S. liberalism and the advancement of Western ideals of regime change under the
auspices of democracy in the form of R2P. Averre and Davies (2015) declared that
Russia prefers the status-quo of the international order, where human rights are secondary
to the international norm of state rights, lending to the concept that the actions of Russia,
appear to undermine the basic principles of R2P. These differences in ideology, as it
pertains to sovereignty, have fueled the complexities over implementing/applying R2P
(Pillar 3) in Syria. Russo (2017) voiced that the case of Syria has revealed the depth of
political and ideological differences among UNSC member states related to the
implementation of R2P’s third pillar, calling into question its effectiveness as an
international norm.
After examining the use of pillar 3 measures in Libya, the negative outcomes,
appear to have affected how the UNSC has engaged the crisis in Syria (Dr. Adams, 2017
& Lopez 2015). Although there are many similarities between the two cases
(Libya/Syria), the lessons learned from the post-conflict in Libya, and the apprehension
of most of the members in the UNSC, except for Russia, to commit resources,
particularly military, has stagnated R2P’s effectiveness. Feikes (2017) expressed that by
not deciding to act in Syria, the U.S. and its NATO allies opened the door to a Russian
intervention on behalf of the Assad regime. The GCR2P has suggested that the UNSC
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has failed to: (a) end indiscriminate air strikes, (b) end the use of illegal weapons, and (c)
ensure humanitarian access.
The data further revealed that inaction in Syria was due to a lack “prospects of
success” (Kildron, 2012 & Odeyemi, 2016). As previously mentioned, there are four
criteria, additionally put forth by Kildron (2012), that should be present when considering
military intervention. If these criteria are met, then the chances of the mission being
successful increase. These conditions were presented but not in Libya and not in Syria.
Table 4 contains the four criteria for success that were based on the forceful intervention
in Libya.
Table 4 explains how Libya met all four criteria and therefore, the chances of a
military intervention by NATO, should be successful. Kildron (2012) explained that
military intervention is not a “Panacea for all humanitarian intervention and should only
be explored in cases with high probability of success” (p. 36). Kildron (2012) also
concluded that the criteria stated in the Libyan model needed to be in place, to achieve
the goals of a successful intervention via force. According to the Libyan Model,
therefore, Syria was not a good case for Pillar 3 measures under the R2P mandate,
because it does not satisfy any of the four criteria needed for a successful intervention.
There is no international mandate that allows for the implementation of Pillar 3 under
Chapter 7 of the UN Charter. Russia and China have used their veto power to block all
resolutions that discussed the use of force within the UNSC, thereby nullifying
consensus. Barber (2019) stated that the Security Council has not been able to do much
on Syria. Barber (2019) further suggested that with limited exceptions, the UNSC has
failed to impose any of the tangible measures that the UN Charter says it may employ to
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give effect to its decisions. This political and ideological divide in the UNSC created the
impossibility of obtaining an international mandate to use R2P, to protect Syrian
civilians. Barber (2019) also communicates this by declaring that the Security Council
cannot take meaningful action in any conflict where the interests of an aggressor align
with those of one of the five permanent members – in other words, most conflicts.
Bellamy (2014) and Morris (2013) both concluded that the pursuit of narrow national
interests by the P5 made it impossible to apply R2P in the Syrian case.
The Syrian crisis seems to have international acknowledgement on the need to
protect civilians that are suffering from mass atrocities and need humanitarian assistance.
For the reasons mentioned above, however, a broad coalition supporting intervention to
protect civilians has been unable to manifest. The division within the UNSC has not
allowed for a broad coalition to form. Differences in ideology, political will, and
skepticism after the Libyan crisis has caused inaction in Syria and allowed for the crisis
to continue. Odeyemi (2016) articulated that when a house is divided, such as the contest
between the Sino-Russia (P2) alliance and the United States–France–United Kingdom P3
alliance over R2P intervention in Syria, that division within the UNSC, leaves civilians
who are at-risk for mass atrocity crimes, un-protected, as are Syrian civilians in this case
(p. 122). Topal (2013) continued along this theme of inaction by declaring that Security
Council could not—and does not have the ability to take action, due to the opposition of
China, and especially Russia. Topal (2013) further cites that the lack of shared political
decisiveness among member states result in the UN possessing an unsustainable structure
incompatible with the conditions of our times (p. 2). The opposition of Russia and China,
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along with the regional influence of India, Brazil, and South Africa (BRICS), have not
allowed for the formation of a broad coalition under the criteria of the Libyan Model.
The third factor in the Libyan Model, regional support, was also revealed in the
data to be another missing part in the prospects of success criteria. The data has shown
that there is no regional support to implement R2P in Syria. Iran has a vested interest,
along with Russia, in keeping Assad in power. On the other hand, Saudi Arabia, U.S and
Israel, would like to see Assad driven from power. Dragovic and Iron (2017) declared
that regional powers such as Turkey, Iran, and Saudi Arabia “have a vested interest in
influencing the postwar settlement to their own advantage” (p. 67). The Arab league has
not been able to declare its support for any group in Syria, thus providing further proof of
regional support being non-existent. Vanhullebusch (2015) suggested that in the present
Syrian crisis, member states of the Arab League are equally trying to profile themselves
when supporting one or the other rebel factions fighting the Syrian government and
paramilitary forces. The data concludes that regional support in the Syrian case has not
been identified, due to multiple actors with varying interests, either for or against the
Assad Regime.
The final criteria stated in the Libyan model calls for a credible opposition force
on the ground in Syria, where a coalition would not have to employ their own ground
forces to ensure success, however, the examination of the Syrian Crisis showed that there
were too many actors on the ground in Syria, pursuing their own interests. These actors
included: Russia, Turkey, forces loyal to Assad, Iran, Hezbollah, Gulf States, Syrian
Democratic Forces, the Kurds, ISISL, and Jordan. Feikes (2017) stated that all have had
boots on the ground at one time or another (intpolicydigest.org). Coen (2015) to conclude
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that Syria has evolved into a protracted civil war and the center of the largest refugee
crisis in the post-World War II era. The situation in Syria has prompted Dr. Simon
Adams (2020) to declare that “Not since the peak of the Cold War has the UN Security
Council appeared so bitterly divided and incapable of decisive action” (p. 1).
Summary
In summary, when answering the research question of whether a historically
consistent application of R2P help alleviate the crisis in Syria, the data revealed that
Libya is the only official case to employ R2P. The Libyan model sets forth criteria for
other situations to be successful, particularly when intervening forcefully. Syria does not
satisfy any of the stated criteria for reasonable prospect of success. Dragovic and Iron
(2017) concluded that the only way to achieve lasting peace in Syria is to establish new
states where the people have common interests and purposes based on their cultural
characteristics.
The first research question (RQ1) asked: Is R2P applied consistently across all
modern crisis-related human endeavors? The theme that emerged from the data was the
constant use of veto power to nullify the consistent application of R2P across all modern
crisis related human endeavors. Data from experts, tables, and charts were used to
demonstrate how members of the P5 in the UNSC used their veto to prevent or stop the
implementation of R2P principles. Thereby, allowing for inconsistencies to emerge from
the initial case of R2P being implemented in Libya and not in Syria despite numerous
similarities.
The second research question (RQ2) asked: Does the application of R2P result in
negative outcomes? The theme associated with answering this research question rests on,
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the failure of R2P after the Libya Model. The data revealed, after an exhaustive
examination of the mistakes made in Libya after using force, that negative outcomes
plagued the nation, despite the strategic objectives being met. Leaving a void where some
experts and nation-states perceived Libyan civilians as being worst off than before the
intervention. The initial objective of protecting civilians, quickly turned into regime
change. This change prompted concern from Russia and China, who now viewed R2P as
an instrument of the West to advance their national and political interests. This situation
also sets the tone for future battles in the UNSC over the implementation and application
of R2P to future crises.
The third research question (RQ3) asked: Would a historically consistent
application of R2P help alleviate the crisis in Syria? The theme of inaction by the UNSC
in Syria emerged to answer this question. The Libyan model was used to determine the
prospect of success. The criteria set forth in this model was applied to other crises to
determine whether the UNSC would be successful in Syria when applying R2P. The data
revealed that Syria did not possess the four requirements to have a successful intervention
force. There was no international mandate, no broad coalition in support of intervention,
no regional support from the Arab league of states or the African Union, and finally, no
credible ground/oppositional force. Syria has many nations involved on the ground, each
serving their own political, economic, and strategic interests, ultimately, creating an
atmosphere of division within the UNSC, resulting in inaction based on the criteria set
forth in the Libyan Model.
In the next chapter, the researcher discusses the interpretation of the findings. This
chapter also includes the limitations of the study, recommendations for future research on
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R2P, and the implications for positive social change that R2P can have on populations at
risk for mass atrocities. Finally, the researcher provides a summary to conclude the study.
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Chapter 5: Discussions, Conclusions, and Recommendations
The purpose of this qualitative case study was to positively impact social change
by examining the implementation of Pillar 3 by the UNSC in a crisis-related situation
such as Syria. This goal was vital to examine, given that Syria has seen mass atrocities
continue and it also continues to disrupt peace and security within the international arena.
The nature of this study was a qualitative methodology and a case study design. The
researcher examined multiple perspectives from multiple secondary sources on the R2P
doctrine, thereby utilizing triangulation to improve the trustworthiness of the study. The
researcher collected the data using a purposeful sampling approach and employed a
criterion-focused sampling strategy to answer the research questions based on the
secondary data. The data collection involved the analysis of the voting patterns/behavior
of the five permanent members of the UNSC who possessed veto power. This was done
by examining UNSC resolutions on Syria from 2015 to 2020. The researcher analyzed
information-rich interviews and testimonies of experts on the R2P doctrine, along with
documents and publications from the NGOs mentioned throughout this study. The study
was conducted to address the identified gap in the literature and to expand on the policy
or policies that guide the UNSC’s decision-making process on using force to stop future
mass atrocities (i.e., the implementation of Pillar 3).
As a result of the analysis of the secondary data for this research study, the
researcher validated the findings of those results involving R2P and the complexities of
implementing/applying Pillar 3 to the Syrian crisis. The UNSC has been regulated to
stalemate status, as Russia and China have used their veto power to block any resolutions
that discuss using force on any level. This inaction—as well as a lack of consistent
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application of R2P across all modern-day related crisis—has allowed the continuation of
mass atrocities in Syria to persist. Figure 3 illustrates how the United States, Russia, and
China have used their veto power since 2011.
Figure 3
Use of the Veto by UNSC Members Since 2011
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The Global Centre for the Responsibility to Protect (2020) stated that for 9 years, the
UNSC has consistently failed to uphold its responsibility to protect the Syrian people.
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Figure 3 illustrates that the use of the veto by Russia and China has risen considerably
since 2011, with the conflict in Syria accounting for the bulk of these. Since 2011, Russia
has cast 19 vetoes, 14 of which were on Syria. Eight of the nine Chinese vetoes during
this period were regarding Syria, and one was on Venezuela. The remaining Russian
vetoes since 2011 were against two resolutions related to the conflict in Ukraine, one on
the 20th anniversary of the genocide in Srebrenica, one on sanctions against Yemen, and
one on Venezuela. The United States has cast three vetoes since 2011, all of them
regarding Israel/Palestine issues. France and the United Kingdom, not shown on the
chart, have not vetoed any resolutions on Syria during this period (2011 to present).
This study also produced important findings about R2P and the effects that the
application of the doctrine has had on emerging nation-states (BRICS) and their
motivation for blocking UNSC action on Syria, based on their shared experiences with
the implementation of R2P in Libya by the United States and its NATO allies. One of the
primary motivations of China, along with India, was the abuse of Western nation-states
during the ages of imperialism and colonialism (Lee & Chan, 2016). Additionally, these
two nation-states tended to still lean toward a state-centered ideology of sovereignty and
were skeptical of R2P being used by the West as a form of regime change. Russia held a
similar position, believing that R2P should focus entirely on the first two pillars, while
suggesting that implementing Pillar 3 should only be done as a matter of self-defense.
Contrary to their beliefs on implementing R2P in Syria, however, Russia and China have
different opinions on the use of force in other crises. China has consented to using force
in Cote d’Ivoire, Libya, and Mali, while Russia has consented to the use of force in Libya
and has militarily intervened directly in Crimea and Ukraine. Furthermore, the current
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investigation generated findings on the negative effects R2P had in Libya, where after the
initial objectives of protecting Libyan civilians were modified into regime change, the
people of Libya were deemed to be in a worst position than before the intervention. The
final findings from the data reflected reasons for inaction by the UNSC in Syria. These
inactions revolved around the notion of “reasonable prospects of success” and national
political and strategic interests.
Interpretation of the Findings
Regarding the research questions, the findings within this research study mostly
support the current literature on R2P, particularly implementing Pillar 3. Patton (2015)
declared that “Qualitative interpretations begins with elucidating meanings [while]
Interpretation involves going beyond the descriptive and attaching significance to what
was found” (p. 570). The three research questions shaped the procedures of this study,
including the data collection, analysis, and interpretation procedures that the researcher
used to answer these questions.
The first research question of this study focused on whether R2P has been
consistently applied to all modern crisis-related human endeavors. The theme that
emerged from the data was the constant use of the veto by the permanent members of the
UNSC. The findings related to this theme confirmed what the current literature has
suggested. The implementation or application of R2P, especially Pillar 3, is a complex
undertaking due to the national interests of the permanent members (P5) in the UNSC.
The results confirmed the deep political and ideological divide within the UNSC, which
has been delegated authority to exercise Pillar 3 measures, where the use of the veto
confirm the inconsistencies in applying R2P to modern crises. Grover (2015) likened this
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division to a semantic game with life-or-death consequences. Additionally, Grover
suggested that “those who are human rights advocates need to play this game more
skillfully to save civilian lives” (2015, p. 1112). The interpretation of this statement is
that individuals and organizations, such as the NGOs mentioned throughout this study,
continue to examine, and develop policy that addresses mass atrocities, but have
alternative ways of implementing or applying R2P, other than, exclusively through the
UNSC. Dr. Simon Adams (2015) called this “institutionalizing the norm” (p. 3). In his
interview with STAIR, Adams discussed how the GCR2P is currently working/training
with African military and police leaders on protecting civilians and their human rights,
stating, “Every day we are trying to learn lessons from Central African Republic or South
Sudan, Nigeria, or Syria and improve the implementation of R2P” (p. 3).
After UNSC implemented Pillar 3 in Libya, Russia and China used their veto
power to further their national interest, and to put a check on what they perceive as the
West expanding their influence in the same manner as during imperialism and
colonialism. Most of their vetoes have come on Syrian resolutions, contesting any U.S.-,
French-, or UK-led resolutions calling for the use of force. Russia continues to use its
veto to protect the Assad government from any resolutions that rebuke his violent
treatment of civilians, including the use of Chemical weapons. The GCR2P (2020) stated
that since the launch of their military offensive in 2019, the Idlib campaign has been an
exercise in organized cruelty as Syrian ground forces and Russian airstrikes have
deliberately targeted schools, markets, hospitals, and displacement centers to terrorize the
civilian population. In pursuing their national interests, the Russians are committed to
using force to in Syria to protect their ideological belief of state-centered sovereignty but
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use their veto to block resolutions suggesting individual sovereignty based on human
rights. China has followed the same premise as the Russians, using their veto eight times
in alignment with Russia on Syrian resolutions. National interests did not seem to
motivate the Chinese in Syria as much as the Russians, but a long history of
colonializations has caused skepticism, along with an ideology that their countries’ past
poverty, underdevelopment, social disorder, and violence can be attributed to colonial
exploitation and encroachment (P. K. Lee & Chan, 2016).
The use of veto by these two nations on R2P-related crises is their way of
protecting their national strategic interests and maintaining checks on the West—led by
the United States—from increasing their influence on smaller, weaker nations. Topal
(2013) confirmed this by suggesting that:
Security Council could not, and does not have the ability to, take action due to the
opposition of China and especially Russia. This picture painfully reveals that the
problems of disproportionate representation, the granting of veto power to a
limited number of member states, and the lack of shared political decisiveness
among member states result in the UN possessing an unsustainable structure
incompatible with the conditions of our times. (p. 2)
The use of the veto has been confirmed by modern researchers to hinder the consistent
application of R2P across all modern crisis-related human endeavors.
The second research question focused on R2P and negative outcomes when it is
applied to a crisis. The theme that emerged focused on the only case where R2P has been
applied and met all the criteria to use force as an intervention tool. The 2011 case of
Libya under the Gaddafi government was deemed a failed state by the UNSC, and a vote
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of consensus was achieved to apply Chapter 7 measures in the form of Pillar 3 of the R2P
doctrine. Led by the United States, a multilateral force implemented strategic objectives
to take ‘all necessary measures’ to protect Libyan civilians, including a no fly-zone,
freezing assets, and an arms embargo. After examining the data and analyzing the results,
the researcher concluded that it was not only confirmed, but that knowledge was
extended as well, reinforcing the suggestions of previous scholars. Some experts have
agreed that mistakes were made in Libya, as well as regrets to foreign policy decisions
(i.e., R2P) that led to instability and eventual regime change (Adams, 2015; Peta, 2017;
Rieff, 2011).
Libya was left in a state of chaos after the initial objectives of protecting Libyan
civilians turned into regime change. Dr. Simon Adams (GCR2P, 2017) declared his
criticism of the application of R2P in Libya, positing that the mandate had been
overstretched. Genser’s (2012) statement can be interpreted as declaring the international
community has an ethical responsibility to rebuild and abdicating this responsibility has
left Libya in chaos due to economic, social, and political instability. Due to the negative
outcomes resulting from the use of force, Libya was essentially starting over, where there
were no legal or legitimate institutions remaining. After overseeing the regime change
following Gaddafi’s death, the United States and its allies left the area, leaving the ITNC
to deal with the aftermath (Genser, 2012). These findings suggest that there should have
been a commitment by the international community to help rebuild, while maintaining
peace and security; however, the transition after the intervention was deemed limited.
There have been murmurings that R2P fell short amongst R2P scholars and a certain
leader (Obama) of the multinational force implementing R2P in Libya. The same critics
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have suggested that should have been a post-conflict effort by the international
community to stay and help rebuild Libya, in terms of re-establishing socio-economic
institutions, promoting peace and restoring relations among combatants. Additionally,
addressing the deteriorating economic and political conditions. These individuals have
called for a fourth pillar being applied to the R2P doctrine: The Responsibility to Rebuild
(Adams, 2015; Friedman, 2015; Lopez, 2015).
In summary, the application of R2P in Libya—being the only case on record—has
resulted in negative outcomes that have left Libya in a perpetual state of chaos. Tharoor
(2020) declared that “Libya has become a global scramble for power and prestige in a
multisided chess match” (para. 1). The failures/negative outcomes of R2P in Libya have
led to civil war and further de-stabilization in the region. Currently, two of the permanent
members of the UNSC (France and Russia), along with various regional nation-states, are
fighting for control in Libya. This will only extend the pain and suffering of Libyan
civilians, resulting in what Tharoor (2020) termed “the Syrianization of Libya” (para.
12). Nine years after the adoption of Resolution 1973, authorizing the use of force under
the R2P doctrine, Libyan civilians are in a worse position than before the intervention.
The final research question of this study, research question three, focused on
Syria, and if R2P had a history of being applied consistently, would this have help to
alleviate this crisis. The theme that the data revealed was inaction by the UNSC. The
findings revealed that there is an emerging group of nations (BRICS)—primarily Russia,
China, and India—that are using their regional influence, coupled with the veto power of
Russia and China, to foster inaction within the UNSC. Their ideological beliefs on
sovereignty tend to run contrary to those of their Western counterparts (Odeyemi, 2016).
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The effects of colonialism, imperialism, liberalism, and regime change, as well as the
belief that the West uses R2P to advance this notion, have impacted their view of the R2P
doctrine (Averre & Davies, 2015; P. K. Lee & Chan, 2016; Russo, 2017). For these
nations, sovereignty is still state-centered, and force should only be taken for self-defense
purposes. This state-centered approach, along with their skepticism of R2P, particularly
Pillar 3, after Libya, has created a divide in the UNSC on Syria, where achieving
consensus is not a viable option, and further creates stagnation (Coen, 2015).
The data revealed that failures in Libya have allowed Russia to block any
consensus to take collective forceful action in Syria, and that sanctions the Assad regime
for using force against civilians. By not taking action, the UNSC opened the door for
Russia to intervene militarily on behalf of Assad. No action was taken to prevent/stop air
strikes against civilians, to stop/prevent the flow of illegal weapons, or to ensure access to
humanitarian aid (Feikes, 2017). The acquiescence to Russian influence in Syria by the
P3 (United States, France, and United Kingdom) have decreased possibilities of R2P
having success on any level. Kildron (2012) compared Syria to Libya and applied the
Libyan model based on the four requirements for R2P to be successful, determining that
Syria was not a good candidate for R2P. Libya had distinct differences from Syria, in
terms of waging a successful military campaign (Table 4). Furthermore, Syria presented
the UNSC with more complexities when considering applying R2P. Factors including
Russian unilateralism, no credible opposing force against Assad, and mass atrocities
being committed on all sides have contributed to inaction by the UNSC (Odeyemi, 2016).
Also, China has approached intervention under R2P as a continuation of Western
colonialization and imperialism. China fears that the powers in the West, led by the
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United States, would infringe on sovereignty, and threaten weaker states into regime
change. P. K. Lee and Chan (2016) suggested there are three reasons for China’s dissent
on R2P: (a) colonialism, (b) strong versus weak states, and (c) the UNSC primarily
consists of Western powers. Although it appears that China has no strategic interests in
Syria (Kildron, 2012), they have voted with Russia on Syrian matters in the UNSC eight
times.
On the other hand, Russia’s and China’s approach to R2P in Syria is contradictory
to other crises, where their national strategic interests vary. Their military interventions in
Ukraine and Crimea are contradictory to their rhetoric in Syria. The Russians claim that
R2P should focus entirely on the first two pillars as a means of protecting vulnerable
populations. In addition, Pillar 3 is viewed as a tool for the West to promote democracy
and regime change. In the Ukraine and Crimea, they have unilaterally intervened using
force (Averre & Davies, 2015). China has promoted the application of R2P in Africa but
refused to do so in Syria. The multi-layered complexities that are present in Syria confirm
the current scholarly conclusions that there is not a reasonable prospect of success. Syria
does not meet the four criteria of the Libyan model. These re-emerging powers (BRICS)
and their belief in the reasonable prospects’ criterion will be counted on to advance R2P
in Syria (see Odeyemi, 2016).
Theoretical Framework Implications
The R2P is a relatively new concept, and the implications of the findings indicate
that future research is needed on the implementation or application of the doctrine to
current crisis and those that may occur in the future. Adams (2015) declared the failure of
the UNSC to end the ongoing atrocities in Syria, highlighting aspects of the norm that
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still need further developing, to address the challenges that still lie ahead. The
Responsibility to Protect is an accepted norm in the international community, every
member state of the UN voted in favor of the doctrine in 2005; however, there is a
preponderance of evidence in the research implying that the conflict exists over
implementation/application. Adams further posited that there is not a single state in the
UN that would say they disagree with R2P. He says that they have won the “abstract of
ideas;” therefore, the remaining debate is on implementation (Adams, 2015, p. 12).
The failure of R2P will continue to revolve around implementation. This
framework emphasizes the first two pillars, and the third pillar is a last resort option.
Nevertheless, as emerging crises in Syria, Libya, and other parts of Africa and Asia
continue to disrupt international peace and security, the debate around implementation
will continue to produce inaction. In all these cases, there is nowhere that falls outside the
realm of R2P. It is just a question of figuring out what the crime is, who is perpetrating it
or is at imminent risk of perpetrating it, and how it should be stopped (Adams, 2015).
Limitations of the Study
To understand the limitations of this study, the researcher began with identifying
his predispositions and biases while collecting and interpreting the data (Patton, 2015).
Other limitations were due to the high volume of secondary data, resulting in the analysis
being extremely time-consuming. Patton (2015) declared that “limited resources, time,
and complexities of the real world do not yield easily to our design parameters” (p. 244).
The complexities of implementing Pillar 3 under the R2P doctrine limited the actions
taken by the UNSC to prevent or stop mass atrocities, not only in Syria, but in most
modern-day crises.
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The scope of the research was limited to role of the UNSC and its inability to
obtain a consensus to apply Pillar 3 measures in Syria. Additionally, this study further
limited by the using only one case (Libya) where Pillar 3 was implemented, to compare
to their actions in Syria. The current findings, therefore, may not be generalizable or
transferrable to other crises without further study. The findings also lack generalizability
due to the complexities of achieving consensus within the UNSC, based on the
differences of national strategic interests and political ideology of the P5.
Recommendations
Considering the results of this study, the researcher has determined that a few
recommendations are necessary. First, the researcher explored the
implementation/application of Pillar 3 through the UNSC, the only entity that is currently
given the authority to implement the use of force as an intervention tool, finding that
inaction due to complexities led to the abdication of their responsibility to maintain peace
and security, according to the principles of the UN Charter. Future research efforts,
therefore, should involve the examination of alternative organizations that could
apply/implement Pillar 3 measures to stop/prevent mass atrocities. Regional
organizations and the UN General Assembly should be examined as those alternatives.
Barber (2019) claimed that the Security Council is not the only organ in the UN system
with responsibility for international peace and security. The General Assembly has a
secondary responsibility for international peace and security and has committed to acting
on it when the Security Council fails. This was not present when examining the current
body of literature. Regional organizations and coalitions of the willing were mentioned in
the literature, but not on an extensive basis as being alternatives to UNSC inaction.
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Second, the researcher focused only on Pillar 3, where the assumption was, that if
Pillar 3 was on the table, then the first two pillars had not been met by the state in
question. Therefore, transferring that responsibility to the international community.
Future research should expand on the R2P doctrine to include adding a fourth pillar, the
responsibility to Rebuild (Adams, 2015; Dragovic & Iron, 2017; Vanhullebusch, 2015).
Rebuilding would focus on the necessary social, economic, and political measures needed
for a recovery that seeks to prevent the recurrence of mass atrocities.
Finally, future researchers should look to expand the ACT Code of Conduct,
where 112 nations have signed this draft resolution, calling for the UNSC permanent
members to withhold the use of their veto power against a credible draft resolution that is
intended to stop or prevent mass atrocities and to take timely and decisive action
(GCR2P, 2017). Only two of the permanent members in the UNSC have signed the
mandate (France and United Kingdom); the United States, Russia, and China have yet to
comply. Additionally, these three members have utilized their veto power regarding the
most concerning issues in the Middle East. The signatories of the Code of Conduct
further declare that “voting to block action to prevent mass atrocities is an affront to our
common humanity” (GCR2P, 2015). It is recommended, therefore, that future researchers
target the expansion of this mandate to those remaining P5 members, as well as the
remaining 83 General Assembly members who have yet to sign. The France/Mexican
Initiative also calls for the suspension of the veto by the P5 in cases of mass atrocities.
This declaration focuses only on the P5 members, but 103 member states already support
the initiative (GCR2P, 2020).
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Implications
Positive Social Change Implications
The current findings reflected difficulties with implementing or applying R2P to
modern-day crises, particularly in Syria. The researcher’s recommendations and other
actions could facilitate positive social change by confirming the literature on the
complexities of implementing Pillar 3, as well as, by adding knowledge through
procedure on how to implement or apply R2P in crisis related situations, when the UNSC
fails to act. The UNSC is currently the sole authorized entity allowed to implement or
apply the use of force to maintain peace and security within the international community.
Crises that put civilians at risk for mass atrocities, infringements of their human dignity,
and violations of their fundamental human rights are associated with failed states,
according to the principles of R2P.
The implications of this study suggest that positive social change should not be
dependent on one particular entity (i.e., UNSC). There is a demonstrable history of
inaction by the UNSC when force is needed as an intervention tool to prevent/stop mass
atrocities. When other governmental entities, including the UN General Assembly,
regional organizations, and coalitions of the willing, in addition to non-governmental
organizations, realize the complexities within the UNSC have created a division that
more than likely leads to inaction, then alternative policy measures should be instituted to
give authorization to implement or apply Pillar 3 to regional states or coalitions of the
willing under the direction of the UN General Assembly. Non-governmental
organizations, such as the GCR2P, continue to promote policies on prevention, but
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a successful transition of authorization is crucial to implementing Pillar 3 where civilians
are at risk for mass atrocities, mass displacement, or mass migration, resulting in a
continuation of loss of human life and dignity.
As previously mentioned in Chapter 1, the overall positive social impact would
allow victims of mass atrocities the opportunity to seek safe havens, where they would
receive medical supplies, food, water, and shelter. Furthermore, establishing safe havens
would be beneficial to neighbor states, where mass migration has had a negative impact
on these states’ economic, political, and environmental well-being.
Methodological and Theoretical Implications
The methodological and theoretical implications of researching the
implementation of Pillar 3 of the R2P doctrine, has inferred the need for future research.
The findings have suggested the follow up on the ACT Conduct code and the
French/Mexican initiative on veto restraint. In his interview with STAIR, Dr. Adams
(2015) claimed that these two important initiatives are directly related to the failures of
the UNSC in Syria. The assessment of the development and impact of veto restraint could
be observed on a case-by-case basis, while NGOs could persistently engage UN member
states on R2P policy and training, as Dr. Adams (2015) indicated:
The framework is useful, as it places the emphasis on the preventive aspect of
R2P, where “institutionalizing the norm,” involves advocacy with the UNSC on
crisis situations, providing advice on policy, and bilateral support for
governments. (p. 10).
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This researcher recommends, therefore, that future scholars should continue to study the
impact of veto restraint in crisis related situations, and the implementation of Pillar 3
measures by alternative means to understand and improve the responses by the
international community. The continued existence of inaction by the UNSC, based on the
findings in this study, will impact the future of R2P, specifically in crisis-related
situations where all diplomatic means have been exhausted.
Conclusions
In this qualitative case study, the researcher examined/analyzed the R2P doctrine,
specifically the implementation of Pillar 3, in the context of Syria. This crisis met all the
requirements of the R2P doctrine to classify Syria as a failed state. There were brief
comparisons between the Libyan case and the Syrian case to assess the implementation of
R2P, using force, because Libya is the only case on record, where the UNSC achieved
consensus to use force as a tool for protecting civilians against mass atrocities.
Secondary data were used as the primary source for collecting data. Multiples
sources were used to obtain voting records, video interviews, documented interviews,
conferences, meetings, videos, documents, charts, tables, and other digital resources. The
researcher used this wealth of information-rich data to understand the complexities
associated with implementing R2P in a crisis such as Syria. The findings confirmed that
R2P has not been consistently applied across all modern crisis-related human endeavors.
Permanent members, specifically Russia and China, have used their veto power to
prevent proposed resolutions from implementing R2P measures in Syria, but have
selectively allowed R2P to be used in other crises. Additionally, the application of R2P in
Libya—the only case on record—was confirmed to have had negative outcomes. The

118
mistakes made in Libya have left civilians worse off today than they were 9 years ago
after the implementation of Resolution 1973. Lastly, current researchers have affirmed
that a historically consistent application of R2P would not have helped to alleviate the
crisis in Syria. Syria presented the most complexities of any of the crises examined in this
study. Syria did not meet the criteria presented in the Libyan model, outlining the
reasonable prospects for conducting a successful intervention, based on Pillar 3 of the
R2P doctrine.
As previously mentioned in Chapter 1, the emergent doctrine of R2P serves as a
guideline for the international community to address mass atrocities. Universally adopted
at the 2005 World Summit Meeting, R2P has three pillars that define the responsibilities
for protecting the civilian populations of nation-states. The UNSC is the sole entity that is
authorized to use forceful measures to protect civilians, if a state manifestly fails to keep
their citizens safe and secure from mass atrocity crimes. In Chapter 2, the researcher
detailed relevant literature that addressed the principles of the R2P doctrine, and how
sovereignty (i.e., state-centered versus individual-centered) inferred the complexities
associated with implementing Pillar 3 to address mass atrocity crises, particularly in
Syria. In Chapter 3, the researcher outlined the methodology and design used to answer
the three research questions. Chapter 4 included the analysis of the data and the findings
from the data. Finally, in Chapter 5, the researcher discussed the interpretations,
implications, and recommendations for future research to examine new policies and
procedures that are necessary to prevent the use of the veto by P5 members in the UNSC/
These policies and procedures could prevent or reduce the inconsistency of the
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application of R2P, resulting in inaction and negative outcomes when addressing mass
atrocities that interrupt international peace and security.
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Appendix A: Tables
Table 1
Vetoed Security Council Resolutions Related to Syria
Date
November 17,
2017

Agenda Item
Renew mandate of JIM for 30
days

Against
Russia, Bolivia

Abstentions
China

November 16, •
2017
•
•

Condemns use of chemical
weapons by Syrian Army.
Taking note of JIM findings
Renew mandate of JIM for 12
months

Russia, Bolivia

China, Egypt

October 24,
2017

Renew mandate of JIM for period Russia, Bolivia
of 1 year

April 12, 2017 •

Condemns use of chemical
weapons.
Access to the OPCW FFM and
JIM to all relevant information to
investigate attacks
Acknowledges findings of JIM
report; use of chemical weapons
by the Syrian Armed Forces and
ISIL
Calls for Tribunal to prosecute
guilty parties.
Sanctions against identified
individuals
Ceasefire (excluding attacks
against ISIL).
Unhindered humanitarian access
Demands end to aerial
bombardments of and military
flights over Aleppo.
Unimpeded humanitarianism
access, including by observing
cessation of hostilities (res.2268

•
February 28, •
2017
•
•
December 5, •
2016
•
October 8, 2016•
•

China,
Kazakhsta
n

Russia, Bolivia

China, Ethiopia,
Kazakhsta
n

Russia, China,
Bolivia

Egypt, Ethiopia,
Kazakhsta
n

Russia, China,
Angola
Venezue
la
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(2016))
May 22, 2014 •

Refers situation in Syria to the
ICC

Russia, China

None

July 19, 2012 •

Renewal of UNSMIS under
Chapter VII
Condemns violations of human
rights Syrian authorities.
All parties commit to cessation of
hostilities and implementation of
six-point plan
Condemns Violence against
civilians carried out by Syrian
authorities.
Supports League of Arab States’
decision to facilitate Syrian-led
political transition.
Calls upon Syrian authorities to
allow safe and unhindered access
for humanitarian assistance
Condemns use of force by Syrian
authorities against civilians.
Allow unhindered humanitarian
access.
Inclusive Syrian-led political
process
Calls on states to exercise
restraint in sale of arms to Syria.
Considers options under Article
41 of the Charter (Sanctions)

Russia, China

Pakistan, South
Africa

Russia, China

None

•
•
February 4, •
2012
•
•
October 4, 2011•
•
•
•
•

Table 2
Passed Security Council Resolutions Related to Syria
Date

Draft

Agenda Item

Abstentions
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December 19, 2017

S/RES/2393

•

•

December 31, 2016

S/RES/2336

•

December 21, 2016

S/RES/2332

•

•

December 19, 2016

S/RES/2328

•

•

Provisions of Bolivia, China, Russia
cross-border
humanitarian
assistance
Calls for
implementation
of Syrian-led
political
transition
Russia/TurkeyNone
facilitated
ceasefire in
Syria
None
Renews
authorization of
relief delivery
across conflict
lines.
Reiterates call
for Syrian-led
and Syrianowned political
transition;
stresses the
Syrian people
will decide the
future of Syria
Unhindered None
access for the
monitoring of
evacuations
from Aleppo’s
eastern districts
Unhindered
access for
provision of
humanitarian
assistance
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November 17, 2016

S/RES/2319

•

None
Extends
mandate of JIM
for 1 year

October 31, 2016

S/RES/2314

•

None
Extends
mandate of JIM
for 18 days

February 26, 2016

S/RES/2268

•

December 22, 2015

S/RES/2258

•

December 18, 2015

S/RES/2254

•

None
U.S. and Russia
facilitated
cessation of
hostilities (as
co-chairs of the
international
Syria Support
Group (ISSG))
Renews (for 12None
months) 2014
decision to
allow passage of
aid into the
country
Sets roadmap None
for peace
process, UNfacilitated talks
between
government and
opposition
members.
Outline of
nationwide
ceasefire
Condemns theNone
use of chemical
weapons
(allegedly used
since the
adoption of
S/RES/2209
(March 2015)

•

August 7, 2015

S/RES/2235

•
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March 6, 2015

S/RES/2209

•

Establishes
OPCW JIM to
investigate

•

Condemns useVenezuela
of chlorine gas
weapon.
Threatens to
take Chapter
VII actions if
non-compliance
with Resolution
2118 (2013)
which endorsed
the destruction
of Syria’s
chemical
weapons
program
None
Renews
authorization
for
humanitarian
access across
border
None
Directs
humanitarian
relief across
additional
border
crossings.
Establishes
monitoring
mechanism to
monitor loading
of humanitarian
nature
Demands all None
parties allow
delivery of
humanitarian
assistance.
Intent to take

•

December 17, 2014

S/RES/2191

•

July 14, 2014

S/RES/2165

•

•

February 22, 2014

S/RES/2139

•

•
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further steps in
case of noncompliance

September 27, 2013

S/RES/2118

•

•

July 20, 2012

S/RES/2059

•

April 21. 2012

S/RES/2043

•

April 14, 2012

S/RES/2042

•

•

None
Endorses
destruction of
Syria’s
chemical
weapons
program.
In event of noncompliance
imposes
Chapter VII
measures
None
Renews
mandate of
Syria Observer
Mission for 30
days
Establishes None
UNSMIS
Observer
Mission for
period of 90
days (300
unarmed
military
observers)
Authorizes None
advance team to
monitor
ceasefire (up to
30 unarmed
military
observers)
Urges
implementation
of Envoy’s SixPoint Proposal
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Table 3
Summation of R2P and its Failures in Libya
Expert analysis on R2P in Libya
Dr. Simon Adams: Executive Director
(GCR2P)
2017 Interview with Natasha Hosford
(STAIRS) St. Anthony’s International
Review

Conclusions on the failures of R2P in
Libya
There will be defeats, setbacks, and
mistakes. As for the specifics of
Libya, I was fiercely critical of
the way some states
overstretched the R2P mandate
in Libya (pp. 7-14).

Thomas Friedman in an interview with Giselle
Lopez (2015)

Thomas Friedman, President Obama
claimed that one of his biggest
regrets with regard to foreign
policy is his lack of foresight
with the Libyan intervention:
“I think we underestimated… the need
to come in full force… the day
after Gaddafi is gone… at that
moment, there has to be a much
more aggressive effort to rebuild
[a society] that didn’t have any
civic traditions.” (p. 121).

Lopez (2015) claims in the article
‘Responsibility to Protect at a
Crossroads: The Crisis in Libya

explores the context in which the
decision was made to intervene
in Libya, the nature of the
intervention and the instability
that has followed the fall of the
Gaddafi regime (p. 122).

Table 4
Four Criteria for Success to use Force as an Intervention Tool (Libyan Model; Kildron,
2012)
Criteria for success

Explanation for the use of force in
Libya
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An international Mandate

A broad coalition to protect civilians

Regional Support

A credible opposition force that already has a
ground game.

Resolution 1973 gave authorization
to the UNSC to use force
under Chapter VII of the UN
Charter. Consensus was
achieved in the UNSC: ten
for, zero against, five
abstentions.
There was a Multinational coalition
led by the U.S. African
Command and included
France, Italy, Great Britain,
and surrounding Arab
nations.
Jordan, Qatar, and Kuwait each lent
support to the no-fly zone
with military aircraft,
providing additional regional
legitimacy to the coalition's
mission
Interim Transitional National
Council (ITNC), recognized
by NATO, maintained a
credible ground force with a
geographically defendable
position, provided air power
a definable objective and a
visible force to support from
the air.

